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CAN PRIVATE CLASS ACTIONS ENFORCE ECONOMIC REGULATIONS?   
DO THEY?  SHOULD THEY? 
Deborah R. Hensler1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years ago representative class actions – lawsuits in which one or a few persons or 
entities are permitted to litigate on behalf of large numbers of other claimants who are not before 
the court – were unique to the United States. Although many jurisdictions permitted parties with 
similar claims to petition the court to proceed jointly with regard to some or all issues (termed 
“permissive joinder” in U.S. law2), the notion that a party could come forward of his, her or its 
own accord, claiming to represent similarly situated others (“the class”) without those others’ 
active consent was considered radical, a violation of due process or perhaps even of human 
rights. In the view of many legal scholars and public officials, the right to pursue a remedy for 
personal injury, property damage, breach of contract, or violation of a constitutional right is akin 
to a property right and belongs to the injured individual. From this perspective, allowing 
someone else to claim a legal remedy on behalf of an injured party interferes with individual 
autonomy. 
Today, however, a growing number of countries provide by law for representative class 
actions. The trend began in Anglo-American countries with common law systems (e.g. Australia, 
Canada, Israel), and then spread to civil law regimes in Asia, Europe and South America. To 
date, at least two dozen countries, with political structures ranging from participatory 
democracies to one-party autocracies, and ideological perspectives ranging from neo-liberal to 
communist, have adopted some sort of representative class action procedure (see Table 1). 
Seventeen of the 25 countries with the largest economies, as measured by GDP,3 permit class 
actions for one or more types of claims. Most of these procedures were adopted in the last twenty 
years.  
  
                                                            
 1 Judge John W. Ford Professor of Law, Stanford Law School 
2 F.R.C.P. 20. 
3 IMF World Economic Outlook, 2014. 
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Table 1 
Countries that Have Adopted Class Actions  
For Some or All Types of Claims 
 
 
NORTH AMERICA 
Canada 
Mexico 
United States 
CENTRAL & SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Columbia 
NORTHERN, CENTRAL & WESTERN 
EUROPE 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
MIDDLE EAST 
Israel 
AFRICA 
South Africa 
ASIA & AUSTRALASIA 
Australia 
China 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Countries debating class action proposals: 
New Zealand, United Kingdom, Switzerland 
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A. What Explains the Spread of Class Actions? 
 
The term legal transplant is commonly used to discuss the introduction of one country’s 
substantive or procedural law or legal practice into another country’s legal system.4  
Comparative law scholars caution that the term may not precisely describe the process of legal 
diffusion. Countries that borrow aspects of other countries’ legal system rarely do so abruptly. 
Rather, laws and practices seem to drift gradually from one country to the next in an amorphous 
process affected by many factors. As diffusion occurs, some features of the original law are 
dropped, others are substantially modified and new features more compatible with the borrowing 
country’s legal system are added.5 For late adopters, the origin of a legal transplant may not be 
very important. 
No one has yet conducted a systematic empirical investigation of the factors that have led to 
the remarkable spread of the modern class action. What we know is based primarily on anecdotal 
data: descriptions of policy debates about adopting class actions outside the United States and 
direct observation of those debates in recent years. Based on these data, the spread of class 
actions seems to be a story of an exotic legal transplant brought into foreign jurisdictions in a 
fairly abrupt fashion and with full awareness of its provenance. References to the United States 
are rife in legislative debates about adopting class action procedures. The proposed procedures 
are explicitly modeled on U.S. federal Rule 23 and when deviations are proposed, often they also 
are modeled on amendments that have been (so far unsuccessfully) proposed in the United 
States.6  Class action opponents warn that adopting a class action procedure will lead their 
country down an undesirable path to frivolous litigation, entrepreneurial lawyering, and undue 
pressure on corporate decision-making, all of which they associate with U.S. litigation.  Class 
action supporters respond that they are not championing “American-style” class actions, but 
rather a version of the procedure that has been crafted carefully to capture the virtues of the U.S. 
class action without its perceived vices. 
Political scientists and comparative law scholars have proposed various explanations for the 
diffusion of social policies generally,7 and legal norms and practice in particular, including 
coercion, economic and political competition, and social learning. Historically, military 
conquests and imperialism were primary sources of legal transplants. England, France, the 
United States and other colonial powers imposed elements of their own legal regimes on those 
                                                            
4 Alan Watson, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1973), is credited with first use of the term.  
5 See, e.g., Michele Graziadei, “Comparative Law as the Study of Legal Transplants,” in Mathias Reimann and 
Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (2206). 
6 For example, most jurisdictions that have recently adopted class actions require that class members affirmatively 
opt in to the class, rather than relying on dissident class members to opt out. Class action reformers in the United 
States have argued unsuccessfully for decades in favor of changing the U.S. rule to require opting in. 
7 For a review of this literature, see Frank Dobbins, Beth Simmons and Geoffrey Garrett, “The Global Diffusion of 
Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition or Learning?” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 33, pp. 
449-72, 2007. 
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they overpowered. Over time, these new rules fused with indigenous norms to create new 
substantive, procedural and evidentiary law. From Yeazell, we learn that U.S. class action law 
derives from medieval English notions of group action, brought to the United States by English 
colonists.8 However, England later abandoned the idea of representative group legal actions,9 and 
in recent years England has been one of the staunchest opponents of class actions in Europe. 
There is no contemporary example of a class action procedure being adopted as a result of 
military conquest or imperialist coercion.  
Contemporary diffusion theorists have focused on less coercive mechanisms for the 
migration of political, social and cultural norms from one nation to another.10 Some theorists 
focus on incentives created by external circumstances, for example, when global financial 
institutions condition aid on the adoption of liberal economic policies, or when national 
policymakers in one country believe they must change their policies to match other countries’ so 
as not to lose out in economic competition. There are some clear examples of such mechanisms 
contributing to the diffusion of legal rules and practices. The World Bank promoted the spread of 
alternative dispute resolution procedures to Latin America.11 Investment arbitration owes its 
popularity to the inclusion of arbitration provisions in bi-lateral investment treaties that 
developing nations enter into in the hope of attracting foreign investment.12 However, contrary 
dynamics appear to be at work in the case of class actions. In recent years, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce has mounted an extensive campaign to discourage other countries from adopting 
class actions.13   Global financial institutions and foreign investors are more likely to take their 
cues from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce than from civil society supporters of class actions. A 
different type of competitive incentive may be at work, however, with regard to class actions. 
Although national decision-makers are unlikely to see class actions as contributing generally to 
                                                            
8 Deborah Hensler et al., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000). 
9 Stephen Yeazell, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP ACTIONS TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).  
10 Dobbins, Simmons & Garrett, supra, note 7. 
11 Maria Dakolis, THE JUDICIAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARRIBEAN: ELEMENTS OF REFORM, World 
Bank Technical Paper 319 (1996) at 37-42 and 52-53. 
12 See, e.g. Viren Michael Mascarenhas, “The Lure of India: Foreign Investment and Investment Treaty Arbitration,” 
Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, October 15, 2014, available at 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/30462/lure-india-foreign-investment-and-investment-treaty-
arbitration. For the background of the establishment of investment treaty arbitration under the aegis of the World 
Bank, see Ibrahim Shihata, “The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment: The Role of the World Bank, 
with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA,” 1 Am. U. J. Int’L & Pol’y 97 (1986).  
13 Institute for Legal Reform, US Chamber of Commerce, “The American Export You Don’t Want,” June 9, 2009, 
available at  
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/the-american-export-you-dont-want/;  Id., “Business Coalition Letter 
to the Japanese Consumer Affairs Agency Regarding Expansion of Class Actions: Urgent Proposition on the 
Japanese Class Action System, March 26, 2013, available at  
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/business-coalition-letter-to-the-japanese-consumer-affairs-
agency-regarding-expansion-of-class-actions/. For more on the US Chamber’s efforts to turn back the spread of 
class actions, see Deborah Hensler, “Third-Party Financing of Class Action Litigation in the United States: Will The 
Sky Fall?” 63 DePaul L. Rev., 1101 (2013). 
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their countries’ economic competitiveness, some lawyers and judges have championed the 
adoption of class actions as a means of bringing more legal business to their courts (and hence 
legal practitioners), or at least not losing ground to neighboring countries’ courts.14 
Other theorists see diffusion of policies and practices, including legal norms, as a species of 
social learning that is not necessarily instrumentally driven. Over time policies or practices may 
migrate from one country to another even when the latter has not clearly identified a problem 
requiring a new policy or when it has little evidence that the borrowed policy will solve its 
recognized problems.  The geographic pattern of the spread of class action procedures suggest 
that “copy-cat” behavior is one explanation of their diffusion. For example, all but one country in 
northern Europe have adopted class action procedures although there is little reason to believe 
that this region of the world has a special need for group legal actions. Leaders of some 
developing nations may see class actions as an indicator of legal modernity. For example, 
Indonesia adopted a class action procedure as part of its 21st century legal reform program, 
although outsiders might think it unwise to initiate a court modernization campaign by adopting 
a complex and controversial procedure.  
Diffusion of policies, including legal transplants, may also result from a rational national 
decision-making process aimed at finding solutions to emergent problems. For example, the 
Netherlands adopted a uniquely consensual version of a class action to provide a mechanism for 
efficiently resolving a multitude of personal injury claims resulting from the use of DES, a 
pharmaceutical product known to cause cancer in daughters of women who were prescribed it 
during their pregnancies.15 The Dutch designers of the procedure have said they looked to the 
United States for a model of how (and how not) to design their procedure. The German 
parliament resisted arguments for adopting a class action procedure to address a flood of 
financial claims against their former national bank, instead adopting a non-representative group 
litigation regime modeled after an English procedure.16 The European Union directive on cartel 
damages adopted in November 2014 was the result of a multi-year consultation process. The 
directive is widely viewed as facilitating private claims for compensation, for example, by 
permitting national courts to order defendants to disclose evidence and by establishing a public 
finding of a violation of cartel law as a rebuttable presumption of liability in a private damages 
action.  Although the final version of the directive does not include a class action provision (as 
                                                            
14 As the U.S. Supreme Court has restricted securities litigation, some Canadian lawyers and judges have proposed 
that their provincial courts (all of which have adopted a class action procedure) take up the slack. Similarly, some 
UK legal practitioners have argued that England needs to adopt a class action procedure to compete with the 
Dutch courts, which have a uniquely expansive class action regime. See Michael Goldhaber, “The Global Lawyer: 
Class Actions Aborning in Europe and the UK,” AmLaw Litigation Daily, October5, 2014 available at 
http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202672410377/The-Global-Lawyer-Class-Actions-Aborning-in-Europe-and-the-
UK?slreturn=20150113192654.  
15 Ianika Tankova and Daan Lunsingh Scheuleer, “The Netherlands,” in Deborah Hensler, Christopher Hodges and 
Magdalena Tulibacka, eds. THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS, Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 2009.  
16 Dietmar Baetge, “Germany,” in Hensler, Hodges & Tulibacka, supra, note 15. 
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was recommended during the lengthy deliberations) observers have suggested that if EU member 
states do not adopt some form of collective procedure within the two year period stipulated for 
implementing the directive, the Commission will return to this issue in the future.17  
Comparative law scholars have focused on the role of legal elites in promoting legal 
transplants.  Lawyers may advocate for the adoption of other countries’ legal rules for 
disinterested reasons. However, they also may champion legal transplants because the 
establishment of new procedures will enhance their own professional status and as a corollary 
their income.18  The globalization of the legal profession, reflected in the growth of graduate law 
programs targeting foreign lawyers, has introduced legal practitioners and judges from around 
the world to legal procedures different from those of their home countries. U.S. law schools 
attract thousands of graduate law students annually, many of whom learn about US civil legal 
procedures, including class actions.19 When they return to their home countries, some of these 
lawyers may advocate for adopting class actions, either as a sign of modernity or as a solution to 
a perceived problem.  
B. Goals of Class Actions 
Proponents of class actions within and outside the United States identify multiple goals for 
representative group litigation. The most widely cited goal is efficient management of mass 
claims.  By allowing one or more individuals or entities to act on behalf of similarly situated 
claimants, courts and parties can resolve a large mass of claims arising out of the same legal and 
factual circumstances in a single action.  Although some class action opponents argue that class 
actions are expensive and time-consuming, when claims number in the thousands or more it is 
unlikely that the total cost of developing the law and facts in each individual case and 
adjudicating each case separately will be less than the cost of a single action, even a relatively 
complex one.  The choice therefore is among managing the claims as an aggregate, consigning 
                                                            
17 Directive 2014/104 of the European Parliament and of the Council, on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringement of competition law provisions of the member states and of the 
European Union, adopted 26 November 2014; and Bryan Cave, “Significant Increase in EU Antitrust Litigation Likely 
As EU Council Adopts EU Damages Directive,” available at http://eu-competitionlaw.com/significant-increase-in-
eu-antirust-litigation-likely-as-eu-council-adopts-eu-damages-directive/ 
18 See, e.g., Bryant Garth and Yves Dezaley, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1998). 
19 My global law seminar most recently included lawyers from Chile, Germany, Israel, Switzerland, Thailand, and 
New Zealand plus a Japanese judge and a Brazilian prosecutor. Switzerland and New Zealand are currently 
debating whether to adopt class actions, and Germany has adopted a group litigation procedure as their preferred 
alternative to a class action. The Brazilian prosecutor was pursuing research on reforming Brazil’s existing class 
action procedure. The Japanese judge was preparing himself to preside over class actions when Japan’s new class 
action law goes into effect. 
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them to inefficient or lower quality individual dispute resolution or ignoring them altogether.20 
The class action is one mechanism for aggregate resolution, albeit not the only one.21 
The second most widely cited goal of class actions is access to justice, particularly for 
claimants who have suffered economic losses as a result of illegal acts, but whose losses are too 
small to warrant costly litigation. Small individual losses are the characteristic consequence of 
violations of consumer protection, anti-trust and employment law but may also occur as a result 
of violations of securities law.  Because in most jurisdictions individual litigation costs are 
substantial, individuals and small businesses that have lost hundreds or even thousands of dollars 
as a result of these sorts of corporate misbehavior have no option but to “lump it.”  Although 
small relative to the transactions of institutions and affluent individuals, such sums are 
significant to many of those who suffer such losses.  By bringing scale efficiencies to the dispute 
resolution process, class actions make litigation of small claims economically viable.  In some 
jurisdictions, such as Australia and Canada, courts have explicitly recognized increasing access 
to courts for claimants with relatively small value claims as a goal of class actions.22  Class 
action opponents in the United States who argue that class action procedures open the courthouse 
doors too wide are usually careful to say the availability of class actions encourages “frivolous” 
litigation. 23 
Improving access to the courts for claimants with small losses can be justified as a matter of 
fairness. Participants in the European debate about class actions have adopted the term 
“collective redress” to refer to the goal of ensuring access to dispute resolution, both court-based 
                                                            
20 Deborah Hensler, “Justice for the Masses? Aggregate Litigation and Its Alternatives,” in Judith Resnik and Linda 
Greenhouse, The Invention of Courts, 143 (3) Daedulus, Summer, 2014; see also Deborah Hensler, “How Economic 
Globalisation Is Helping To Construct A Private Transnational Legal Order,” in Sam Muller et al., eds. THE LAW OF 
THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW, Torkel Opsahl, 2011. 
21 Others include multi-district litigation (MDL) in the United States, the Group Litigation Order (GLO) in the United 
Kingdom and the Capital Market Model Case (KapMug) procedure in Germany. See Hensler, Hodges & Tulibacka, 
2009, supra note 15. 
22 P DAWSON NOMINEES PTY LTD v MULTIPLEX LTD and Another 
2007 FCA 1061 FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA 242 A.L.R. 111 July 19, 2007 (“On the second reading of the Federal 
Court Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth) which introduced Pt IVA [the Australian Federal Class Action] the Attorney-
General said that the class action procedure was needed for two purposes; “The first is to provide a real remedy 
where, although many people are affected and the total amount at issue is significant, each person's loss is small 
and not economically viable to recover in individual actions ... The second purpose ... is to deal efficiently with the 
situation where the damages sought by each claimant are large enough to justify individual actions and a large 
number of persons wish to sue the respondent. The new procedure will mean that groups of persons, whether 
they be shareholders or investors, or people pursuing consumer claims, will be able to obtain redress and do so 
more cheaply and efficiently than would be the case with individual actions.””); WESTERN CANADIAN SHOPPING 
CENTRES INC. v. DUTTON, File No.: 27138, SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534; 2001 SCC 46; 2001 
S.C.R. LEXIS 46, July 13, 2001 (“Without class actions, the doors of justice remain closed to some plaintiffs, 
however strong their legal claims.  Sharing costs ensures that injuries are not left unremedied.”)  
23 See, e.g., John Beisner, Jessica Miller & Gary Rubin, Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble: Third Party Litigation 
Financing in the United States, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform (2009) at 4.  Available on the 
web at http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf  
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and out-of-court, when mass harms produce many small-value claims.  Framing access as 
“redress” focuses on the compensatory goal of legal dispute resolution.  Many class action 
advocates, however, view ensuring court access for claimants with small – or even large -- losses 
as a means of bolstering enforcement of economic regulations when public enforcement is absent 
or insufficient.  The Supreme Court of Canada has identified deterrence as one of the goals of 
Canadian class actions.24 During debate in Australia’s parliament about adopting class actions, 
the then Minister of Justice and Consumer Affairs asserted that the ability of shareholders to 
bring class actions “will be a great aid to the more formal regulators, such as the Australian 
Securities Commission.”25 Whether regulatory enforcement ought to be a goal of collective 
litigation (whatever the size of claimed losses) is central to controversy over the use of class 
action procedures in virtually every jurisdiction that has considered adopting, expanding or 
restricting their use.26  
C. Research Questions and Approach 
This essay focuses on the use of private class actions to enforce economic regulations.  The 
regulations of interest include employment and consumer protection, product safety, anti-trust 
and securities law.  There is a vast theoretical literature on regulatory enforcement that straddles 
multiple disciplines, including economics, political science, psychology and law. Most theorists 
agree that effective enforcement requires a combination of self-regulation by market actors, 
public enforcement by regulatory agencies and criminal prosecutors, and private litigation. 
However, theorists, practitioners and public policymakers disagree about the relative roles to 
                                                            
24 Hollick v. Toronto (CITY) (2001) 205 DLR (4th) 19, 28-29 (“Class actions serve efficiency and justice by ensuring 
that actual and potential wrongdoers modify their behavior to take full account of the harm they are causing, or 
might cause, to the public.” 
25 Australia Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Nov. 13, 1996, cited in Michelle Welsh and Vince Morabito, 
“Public v Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: An Australian Empirical Study, 14 Journal of Comparative Legal 
Studies 39 (2014) at 43. However, the final wording of the act does not mention deterrence (“behavior 
modification”) as a goal. Id.  
26 Hensler, Hodges & Tulibacka, supra note 15. William Coleman, a prominent member of the 1966 committee that 
drafted the contemporary version of the American Rule 23, asserted that strengthening private enforcement of 
statutes and regulations was not among the committee’s goals. William Coleman, 4 Working Papers of the 
Advisory Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 456 (1997).  However, well before the adoption of the 
modern version of Rule 23, legal scholars recognized the use of class actions for regulatory enforcement. See e.g. H 
Kalven Jr and M Rosenfield, “The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,” 8 U Chicago L R 684 (1940-41).  
 
David Crane argues that at least in the antitrust domain, private enforcement is unsuccessful in meeting 
both compensation and deterrence goals. Rather than relying exclusively on public enforcement, however, Crane 
argues that the goal of private enforcement ought to be to “negotiat[ing] forward-looking solutions,” with limited 
judicial involvement.  Id, “Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement,” 6 Vand. L. Rev 675 (2010) at 677, 716-717.  
Crane’s proposal somewhat resembles Sabel & Simon’s prescription for public law litigation. See Charles Sable & 
William Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1016 (2014). Whether 
and under what conditions, parties could and would collaborate to design and implement remedies is uncertain. 
See Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, “The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Structural Reform of 
the American Workplace,” University of Michigan Law School Public Law and Theory Research Paper No. 340 
(August 2013) at 3 – 6.   
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assign public and private actors. This essay addresses three questions that are relevant to that 
issue: 
 
1) Can the modern class action, modeled after the U.S. federal Rule 23, enforce economic 
regulations?   
2) In the jurisdictions in which they have gained the most traction do class actions help 
enforce economic regulations, and if so, under what circumstances?  and 
3) Should public policy makers permit private class actions that have as their primary 
purpose enforcing economic regulations?27 
The essay deals solely with class actions brought by private actors, excluding civil enforcement 
litigation brought by public regulatory agencies such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) and 
parens patriae suits brought by state Attorneys General in the US, which are sometimes 
analogized to or confused with private class actions.28  Section II describes the key features of 
class actions and discusses how the formal design of class action procedures and the interaction 
of class action rules with other legal rules affect the potential of private class actions to enforce 
economic regulations.  Section III marshals the available empirical evidence on how class 
actions work in practice, which come from the United States, Australia, and Israel. These data 
indicate the frequency of class action lawsuits over time and among jurisdictions, how they are 
disposed (e.g. settlement vs. adjudication) and their legal outcomes. But the section concludes 
that the available evidence is too incomplete to determine the general effectiveness of private 
class actions in regulating different sectors of the economy.  The inadequacy of the evidence 
demonstrates that policy-makers should be cautious about sweeping assertions about the 
consequences of class actions, either for good or ill.  Sec. IV outlines the ingredients of an 
empirical research program that would better inform public and private decision-makers about 
the uses and outcomes of private class actions. Absent better data on the relative contributions of 
public and private enforcement mechanisms to economic regulation, under different 
circumstances, Sec. IV argues that we should craft regulatory policies that promote redundancy.  
 
II. CAN PRIVATE CLASS ACTIONS ENFORCE ECONOMIC REGULATIONS? 
                                                            
27 A similar set of questions regarding class actions against public actors merits discussion.  In the United States, 
“social impact” litigation that attempts to use class actions to achieve sentencing reform, welfare reform, 
education reform and a host of other social policy goals has evoked almost as much controversy as private damage 
class actions.  My essay leaves questions about the proper role of class actions in regulating public actors’ behavior 
for another day. My essay also omits discussion of the class action as a compensatory mechanism, except as this 
relates to the regulatory enforcement goal. 
28 See e.g., Margaret Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys’ General, 
126 Harv. L. Rev. 486 (2012).  
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 As a formal matter, private class actions can directly affect private actors’ economic 
behavior by enjoining them from or directing them to pursue specific policies.  Injunctions may 
force economic actors to stop engaging in illegal behavior; by clarifying the laws that govern the 
economy declaratory judgments can shape future economic behavior.  In the United States, Rule 
23 (b) (2) provides for injunctive class actions.29  Many other jurisdictions that have adopted 
class actions restrict the remedies obtainable to injunctive and declaratory relief in all or most 
circumstances.30   
Class actions can also regulate economic behavior indirectly by requiring market actors 
to pay damages for violating the law.  The notion that damage class actions can deter 
misbehavior is a straightforward extension of the economic analysis of tort law.31  Deterrence is 
a product of the likelihood that those who are injured by an employer’s, manufacturer’s or 
service provider’s misbehavior will bring a lawsuit in the form of a class, the likelihood that the 
class will prevail by settlement or adjudication, and the value of the damages (if any) the 
defendant pays.  From a deterrence perspective, whether the class members recoup their damages 
or whether the defendant pays an equivalent sum to others (e.g. in the form of cy pres remedies) 
or indeed to class counsel is irrelevant.32  The goal is to incentivize economic actors to include 
the expected value of injuries or losses caused by their illegal behavior (including their own legal 
expenses) in their calculus when deciding whether and how to design, produce, distribute and 
market a product or service and how to treat their employees.33  
                                                            
29 Prior to recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, injunctive class actions were the most common form of civil rights 
class actions on behalf of employees and customers seeking elimination of discriminatory practices.  In Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011), the Court de-certified an employment discrimination class action 
brought by female employees of the retail giant.  A divided court held that the claims did not satisfy the 
commonality requirements of Rule 23(a).  At the same time, the justices unanimously held that 23(b)(2) could not 
be used to pursue the class members’ damages claims. 
30 Deborah Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview in Hensler, Hodges & Tulibacka, 2009, supra, 
note 15. 
31 See, e.g. Geoffrey Miller, “Group Litigation in the Enforcement of Tort Law,” in Jennifer Arlen, ed., RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT (2013); Guido Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL 
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). 
32 John Connor, “Optimal Deterrence and Private International Cartels,” April 2006, SSRN-ID787927, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=787927 (noting that this view of deterrence is not universal 
but widely shared by “Chicago-school” economists) 
33 Some contemporary regulatory theorists have proposed an enforcement strategy that relies less on economic 
sanctions and more on building reciprocal relationships with regulated entities to encourage compliance. 
“Responsive regulation” scholars propose a “pyramid” of responses to regulatory violations in which regulators 
first attempt to find mutually acceptable changes in behavior and move on to increasingly burdensome demands if 
and only if the regulatory entities fail to comply. At the apex of the pyramid are criminal prosecution and monetary 
sanctions. First proposed by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, responsive regulation has been taken up by a large 
number of scholars and policymakers worldwide. Id., RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992). Two perspectives on responsive regulation have emerged, one relying on a game 
theoretic approach in which regulators respond positively or negatively to the regulated entities depending on the 
latter’s behavior (“tit-for-tat”) and the other relying on a “restorative justice” approach in which the regulators 
attempt to build a trusting and mutually respectful relationship with the regulated entities. ). See Vibeke Nielsen 
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U.S. class action law is generally viewed as more supportive of regulatory enforcement 
class actions than the rules and law of other jurisdictions.34  However, recent decisions by the 
U.S. Supreme Court have cut back sharply on the potential for regulatory enforcement via class 
actions in virtually all realms of economic behavior including employment,35 consumer 
transactions,36 anti-trust,37 and securities fraud.38 Although many commentators assume that 
mass personal injury claims such as product liability, toxic exposure and catastrophic accident 
claims are routinely treated as class actions in the United States, U.S. federal courts have long 
disfavored certifying these as class actions.39   
                                                            
and Christine Parker, “Testing Responsive Regulation in Regulatory Enforcement,” 3 Regulation and Governance 
(2009) Using Australian data on anti-trust enforcement, the authors found it difficult to identify instances of 
systematic application of “tit-for-tat” responsive regulation and no measurable effects of either “tit-for-tat” or 
restorative justice-based responsive regulation on compliance. Responsive regulation theorists note that civil 
society may play an important role in assisting public regulators in persuading the regulated to comply, particularly 
in jurisdictions where public regulators are poorly funded, captured, or corrupt. See John Braithwaite, “Responsive 
Regulation and Developing Economies,” 34 World Development 884 (2006).  
34 Traditionally, such suits have been referred to as “private attorneys general” suits. See John Coffee, “Rescuing 
the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working,” 42 Ms. L. Rev. 215 
(1983). See also, Id., “Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: the Implications of Economic Theory for Private 
Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, “86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986). Morris Rattner argues 
that the classic model of entrepreneurial class action lawyering ignores firm organizational factors that may 
militate against fee maximization in individual class action lawsuits. Id., “A New Model of Plaintiff Class Action 
Attorneys,” 31 Rev. Litig. 1 (2012).  
35 See, e.g. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011) (decertifying a class of female employees 
charging gender discrimination in promotion and pay.)  Previous decisions upheld contractual requirements to 
arbitrate a wide range of employees’ rights claims.  See e.g. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 
(U.S. 1991) (holding an employee who signed an employment contract containing an arbitration clause can be 
compelled to arbitrate claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 
(U.S. 2001) (holding that an African-American employee who signed an employment contract containing an 
arbitration clause can be compelled to arbitrate claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.) Subsequent decisions 
upheld arbitration clauses barring any form of collective proceeding.  
36 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (U.S. 2011) (upholding an arbitration provision in a consumer 
contract prohibiting any type of collective proceeding.) 
37 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (U.S. 2013) (decertifying an anti-trust class on the grounds that the 
damage model was not consistent with the class definition), and Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 
2304 (U.S. 2013) (holding the fact that anti-trust damages would be too expensive to prove on an individual basis 
was not sufficient to void an arbitration clause prohibiting any form of collective proceeding).  On trends in U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions on private regulatory enforcement and their correlation with judicial ideology, see 
Stephen Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Perspective, 162 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1543 (2014).  
38 In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the “fraud-on-the market” theory – the so-called Basic presumption, 
enunciated in In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978,  (1967) -- that has provided the underpinning for securities 
class actions for the past several decades, but enhanced the defendant’s ability to introduce evidence prior to class 
certification to rebut the application of the theory to the lawsuit against it.  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (U.S. 2014). Although the Court’s decision was unanimous, three justices concurred in the 
judgment on the case only, dissenting on the core issue of the continued viability of the fraud-on-the-market 
theory. Justices Alito, Scalia and Thomas held that the Court’s decision in Basic should be overturned. 
39 Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (U.S. 1997) (decertifying a class of workers exposed to asbestos 
products). 
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The regulatory enforcement potential of all class action procedures depends primarily on five 
features:  
 Their legal scope (What kinds of cases can be brought as class actions?)  
 Their standing rules (Who can represent the class?)  
 Whether the procedure is “opt-in” or “opt-out” (How is class membership determined?)  
 The type of remedy available (What can successful class members obtain?) and  
 Legal financing rules (Who pays the legal costs of bringing class actions?). 
Scope, standing, the choice between opt-out and opt-in provisions and the type of remedies 
available to successful class members are essential aspects of any class action procedure. But the 
prevailing legal financing rules, which policymakers generally have not modified when they 
adopt class action procedures, significantly affect whether class actions (whatever their design) 
will be utilized, under what circumstances and with what consequences. Indeed, the adoption of 
a class action procedure is rarely accompanied by other changes in a jurisdiction’s substantive or 
procedural law that may restrict its use The undermining of class action goals by the failure to 
change other aspects of a legal regime that are essential to the success of class actions is a classic 
example of the barriers to successful implementation that are encountered by legal transplants.  
A. Scope 
In the United States class actions are trans-substantive, meaning that absent case-specific 
restrictions, they can be used to regulate diverse behavior, including employment practices, 
consumer transactions, compliance with anti-trust (anti-competition) and securities law and other 
financial practices.  In many other jurisdictions that have adopted class actions, however, class 
claims only are authorized for violations of particular statutes, such as those dealing with 
securities fraud, anti-trust/cartel regulation or consumer protection law. Often authorization for a 
representative class action is included in the substantive statute, rather than in a separate 
procedural rule. Among common law jurisdictions, trans-substantive class action rules prevail, 
reflecting a general proclivity for trans-substantive procedures in Anglo-American legal regimes. 
In Asia, most class action procedures apply only to securities fraud or consumer protection,40 
while the picture in Northern and Western Europe and Latin America is mixed. It is common for 
countries to adopt a limited scope procedure and then, over time, if it is deemed successful, to 
broaden it to cover other areas of law.41 For example, Israel first limited the scope of class 
actions through individual substantive statutes but later adopted a procedure that can be used for 
many different types of substantive claims, although it is not completely trans-substantive.  
Belgium and France, which long resisted the European trend towards class actions, both adopted 
class action procedures in 2014, but limited their application to consumer protection. Japan is 
                                                            
40 Indonesia is an exception to this pattern; there class actions have been used primarily in environmental damages 
and mass accident cases. Mas Achmad Santosa, “Indonesia,” in Hensler, Hodges & Tulibacka, 2009 supra note 15. 
41 Hensler, 2009 supra note 30 at 14. 
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another jurisdiction that had strong reservations about class actions; in 2013 it adopted a class 
action procedure for consumer protection cases.  
B. Standing 
In Australia, Canada, the United States and some other jurisdictions an individual, NGO or 
business entity may come forward and offer to represent a similarly situated group of individuals 
or organizations.  The court may review the capacity of the party to adequately represent class 
members’ interests (including whether the party is “typical” of the class) but the representative 
need meet no other requirements.  In other jurisdictions, only properly incorporated 
organizations (e.g. Italy), specially vetted associations (e.g. Taiwan), special purpose foundations 
(e.g. the Netherlands) or a government official (e.g. Brazil, Denmark) have standing to represent 
a class in some or all circumstances.  Limiting standing to represent a class to government 
officials or parties approved by government officials makes it less likely that a class action can 
go forward when public officials themselves would prefer not to enforce regulations against 
economic actors.  In theory, government officials would base such decisions on legal analysis, 
perhaps tempered by cost-benefit considerations.  In practice, the officials may be captured by 
the interests they are authorized to regulate.  In such instances, a class action procedure that 
requires officials’ authorization to go forward is unlikely to contribute to regulatory 
enforcement.42 
C. Opt-out vs. Opt-in 
A highly controversial aspect of U.S. damage class actions is the opt-out rule that permits 
one or a few parties to represent a class of hundreds, thousands or even millions without those 
class members actively consenting to the action.43  The enormous potential size of some opt-out 
classes – and the related potential damages – increases defendants’ risk, which critics assert 
increases defendants’ likelihood of settling non-meritorious claims (popularly termed “blackmail 
settlements”). 44  However, when individual losses are relatively modest, it is unlikely that many 
class members will invest the effort required to “opt in” to a class action.  Other things equal, 
therefore, we would expect opt-in class actions to provide less deterrence in situations where 
defendants can garner large financial rewards from imposing small but illegal additional costs on 
individuals and businesses. Such individually small losses for class members accompanied by 
very large gains for corporations are characteristic of consumer suits and some anti-trust suits.  
                                                            
42 Id. In principle a representative organization deemed “safe” by government officials and market actors at one 
time might become more assertive subsequently, perhaps to the point of over-enforcement of regulations. Even if 
this contradicted government policy, it might be politically difficult for a government to remove its official sanction 
from such an activist representative organization. I do not know of any jurisdiction that has experienced this to 
date. 
43 U.S. class actions for injunctive relief do not provide for opting out; the class is defined by counsel as approved 
by the judge.   
44 The available evidence is inconsistent with assertions that such settlement are common. Hensler, 2013, supra, 
note 13. 
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Australia, Canada, and Israel permit opt-out class actions but most countries’ procedures insist 
that class members pro-actively indicate their desire to participate in the class in all or most 
circumstances.45 
D. Damages 
Economic actors who violate the law in the United States may be subject to statutory or 
common law damages.46  The risk of large damages, including punitive damages, is perceived as 
especially high in cases that are tried to jury, although outsized damages awarded by juries may 
be reduced by the trial judge or an appellate court.  In the United States, the fact that a claim is 
filed in the form of a class action does not restrict damage enhancements such as statutory treble 
damages and common law punitive damages, and class representatives have the same right to 
jury trial as individual plaintiffs.  The availability of exceptional damages, plus the potential for a 
jury trial, means that the expected value of many U.S. damage class actions is huge.47  In theory, 
this potential should enhance the deterrent potential of class actions – in the view of corporate 
critics, far beyond the optimum.  If class members can only obtain injunctive or declaratory 
relief, as is true in many jurisdictions, injured individuals and entities will have lesser incentives 
to come forward and potential wrongdoers may decide that the expected value of a penalty for 
violating the law is too small to justify compliance.48 The low rate of class action litigation in 
countries that formally provide a class action procedure (e.g. Denmark, Norway and Sweden) is 
widely attributed to the unavailability of monetary remedies. In most jurisdictions, punitive 
(exemplary) damages are never or rarely available, in individual or collective litigation. 
E. Legal Financing 
The U.S. legal financing regime is very favorable to class action litigation.  Except in cases 
where statutory fee-shifting prevails, each side pays its own costs, eliminating any risk of 
adverse costs for class members.  A lawyer is allowed – indeed, expected – to represent the class 
on a speculative basis.  Because law firms must invest their own funds to maintain the class 
action and the firm will receive reimbursement of its expenses only if the litigation succeeds, the 
system favors resource-rich firms that have been successful in prior litigation.  As a result, the 
class is likely to obtain better than average representation.  If the class prevails, by settlement or 
trial, the judge will award counsel fees and expenses and all class members will pay a share of 
these, directly or indirectly.49  As a result, there is no financial disincentive for a class member to 
                                                            
45 Hensler, 2009, supra note 30, at 15-16. 
46 For examples of statutory damage provisions in diverse domains of economic activity, see Bert Huang, 
Concurrent Damages, 100 Va. L. Re. 719 (2014) at Fn 9.  
47 See Huang, supra  note 47 at Fns. 18,19, & 20 (identifying legal restrictions but noting cases where the potential 
for excessive damages evoked judicial concern) 
48 Id., at 14. 
49 Some discussions of class action outcomes distinguish between cases in which attorneys’   fees are calculated 
explicitly as a share of the total settlement fund and cases in which attorney fees are calculated separately “on top 
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step forward and offer herself as a class representative.50  Critics of U.S. class actions argue that 
the intersection of these legal financing rules with class action rules produces excessive numbers 
of class actions, many of which are “frivolous,” as well as settlements that reward class action 
lawyers far more than the settlement is worth to class members. Under U.S. class action rules 
judges are charged with deciding what plaintiff counsel should receive for their time and 
expenses, when the class prevails. Legal doctrine provides for two approaches to calculating 
fees, the “percent of fund” method, akin to contingency fees plaintiffs agree to pay in ordinary 
personal injury litigation, and the “lodestar” method, that yields the product of attorney hours, 
typical hourly rates in the jurisdiction in which the class action was litigated (the “lodestar”), and 
a discretionary “multiplier” that may enhance (or reduce) the product to reflect the lawyer’s 
effort and the riskiness of the case.51  
Many other jurisdictions that have adopted class action procedures have legal financing 
regimes that are far less favorable to class litigation.  In jurisdictions that require losing parties to 
pay the prevailing parties’ fees this risk looms very large for representative plaintiffs, especially 
if they alone among the class members are responsible for costs and have to post bond against 
that possibility.  In jurisdictions in which lawyers may not represent clients on a speculative basis 
(e.g. “no win, no fee”), representative plaintiffs must contract to pay the class counsel’s hourly 
fees and expenses as the case moves forward, as well as potential adverse costs, a daunting 
proposition. If the representative plaintiff is an individual who contracts with a law firm to 
prosecute the class action while other class members get a “free ride,” it is more attractive for 
class members to hang back than to come forward to offer themselves as representative 
plaintiffs. In jurisdictions that grant standing to represent a  class only to associations, not all 
NGOs have sufficient resources to shoulder these costs and risk, and even those that do may 
worry about their members’ reactions to the toll on the association’s resources if the class does 
not prevail.    In these sorts of legal financing regimes, class actions are more likely to be under-
utilized than over-utilized.52  
Third-party litigation financing has emerged as a response to limitations on class action 
litigation imposed by legal financing rules outside the United States.  In Australia, where the 
notion of investing in commercial litigation seems to have first taken hold, litigation financers 
                                                            
of” or in addition to the settlement fund.  As a practical matter, defendants always focus on the total amount they 
are committed to pay, without regard to its division between class members and attorneys. 
50 U.S. class representatives may receive a financial incentive to compensate them for their involvement in the 
litigation, but such incentives are deliberately modest so as to avoid a conflict of interest between the class 
representative and class members.  See, e.g., Memorandum and Order, In re Payment Card Intercharge Fee and 
Merchant Discount Anti-trust Litigation, Case 05-MD-1720, January 10, 2014. 
51 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION FOURTH, 2004, §21.7. 
52 Interestingly in view of international criticism of U.S. class counsel fees, judges outside the United States 
generally do not review attorney fees in ordinary or class litigation, on the grounds that they are strictly governed 
by attorney-client contracts. Bars against contingency fees or other speculative fee arrangements are imposed by 
national bars’ professional responsibility rules. Lawyers sometimes find ways around these restrictions, for 
example, by charging modest hourly rates plus “success fees” when their clients prevail. 
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contract with class members to pay class counsel and take on the risk of adverse costs in return 
for a share of any damages the class member may obtain.  Although Australian law does not 
permit lawyers to charge fees calculated as a share of damages, the litigation financers are not 
subject to such restrictions.  The financers’ contracts with class members have transformed what 
is formally an opt-out class action regime into an opt-in regime, as the financer only offers 
support to those with whom it contracts.  “Closed classes” comprising all of the financers’ 
customers have been challenged but upheld by Australian courts as a necessary mechanism for 
overcoming the financial barrier to class litigation that would otherwise exist.53  In Europe a 
different mechanism has emerged: corporations with anti-competition claims assign their claims 
to a special purpose financial entity that hires lawyers to represent it in a single action for the 
total value of those claims, obviating the need for a formal procedure for collective litigation.54 
Third-party financing has emerged only recently in the United States, and financers claim to be 
steering their investment away from class actions.55 However, many financers contract directly 
with law firms that represent plaintiffs in mass litigation, both class actions and non-class 
aggregate litigation. 
In addition to legal financing rules, other aspects of civil legal regimes may facilitate or 
hinder regulatory enforcement litigation, whether individual or in class form. Relaxed 
jurisdictional rules allow plaintiffs to choose friendlier fora and relaxed disclosure (“discovery”) 
rules make it more likely that plaintiffs will be able to obtain evidence to support their liability 
and damage claims. Longer statutory limitations give plaintiffs more time to uncover 
wrongdoing and file claims.56  
 
III. DO CLASS ACTIONS ENFORCE ECONOMIC REGULATIONS? 
To enforce economic regulations using class actions, class members or their representatives 
must identify instances of legal violations by economic actors, file suits to challenge the 
violations, and prevail either by winning a trial verdict or negotiating a settlement that forces a 
change in behavior or imposes financial costs on those actors (or both). Defendants must also 
comply with court judgments and settlement terms.  If class actions are the only deterrent 
mechanism, and the goal is optimal deterrence, the costs imposed by class actions on defendants 
(including monetary remedies and legal expenses) should reflect the costs imposed on class 
members by the defendants’ illegal behavior, adjusted upward in order to take into account the 
                                                            
53 Multiplex Funds Management Limited v P Dawson Nominees Pty Limited (2007).  
54 Damien Giradin & Laurie-Anne Grelier, “Cartel Damages Claims in the European Union: Have We Only Seen the 
Tip of the Iceberg?” December 2, 2013, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2362386.  
55 Hensler, 2013, supra note 13. 
56 Geradin & Grelier, supra, note 54 (discussing why the UK, Germany and the Netherlands are attractive 
jurisdictions for plaintiffs seeking cartel damages).  
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likelihood that victims will not file claims for all instances of similar violations.57  Higher costs 
than the adjusted amount will over-deter the targeted behavior and lower costs will under-deter 
the behavior.  If public prosecution -- criminal charges or civil enforcement actions-- 
accompanies private class actions, and if victims’ compensation is irrelevant, then the optimal 
deterrence calculation arguably should take into account the expected value of criminal and civil 
penalties (and the costs of defending against these) as well, and the costs class actions impose 
should equal whatever fraction remains.  It follows that assessing the contribution of private 
class actions to optimal deterrence requires data not only on class action claiming rates and 
outcomes but also on the likelihood and outcomes of criminal and civil enforcement actions.  For 
each enforcement mechanism we need to know as well the accuracy of decisions to enforce – i.e. 
the ratio of false negatives to false positives – and the relationship between the total sum of 
penalties, fines and damages paid by the defendant and the costs that the defendant’s illegal 
behavior imposed on others.  In addition, a full accounting of the contribution of private class 
actions to regulatory enforcement should include the value of information uncovered by private 
enforcement suits to public enforcers and the effect of private suits and the publicity attending 
them on public actors’ decisions to pursue enforcement actions. 
The empirical data to perform this complex set of calculations do not exist for any 
jurisdiction that has adopted representative class actions, including the United States.58 Pointing 
to individual instances of perceived litigation failure, some critics of regulatory enforcement 
class actions conclude that U.S. class actions fail to perform a useful regulatory function; 
pointing to different examples, others argue to the contrary that class actions play an important 
regulatory role.  However, without data on the frequency of legal violations, the rates of private 
enforcement relative to violations via class actions and public enforcement via the criminal 
justice and civil enforcement regimes, and the direct and indirect outcomes of both, it is 
impossible presently to draw evidenced-based conclusions about the general utility of class 
actions in the United States or elsewhere for enforcing market regulations.59   
                                                            
57 Deterrence theorists might also support downward adjustments to reflect indirect costs of litigation, such as loss 
of market share and diminished stock values that often occur in the immediate aftermath of high profile class 
litigation. See Deborah Hensler, “The Socio-Economics of Mass Torts: What We Know, Don’t Know and Should 
Know, in Jennifer Arlen, ed., RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORTS (2013).  The goal of 
optimal deterrence is for the economic actor to “internalize” the costs of its decisions and engage in the relevant 
behavior – e.g. manufacture and distribute the drug, contract with a worker or consumer, etc. – when the benefits 
outweigh these costs.  
58 This situation is not limited to class actions; most jurisdictions do not collect sufficient data to support a cost-
benefit analysis of the effects of individual litigation either. But at least in the United States, there have been 
attempts to systematically measure claiming rates and outcomes of certain types of individual civil litigation in 
selected jurisdictions and time periods. Perhaps because of their relative rarity in the United States and their 
relatively recent introduction elsewhere, class actions have been subject to far less empirical research. 
59 Most jurisdictions that have adopted class actions have even poorer statistics than U.S. courts. The authors of 
the country reports included in Hensler, Hodges & Tulibacka (2009) supra note 15 were asked to provide data on 
the number and type of class actions that had been filed in their jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions where only a 
small number of class actions had been filed the authors were able to describe each one. However, all of the 
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Rather than throwing up our hands in despair at this sorry state of affairs we could allow it to 
motivate us to develop an empirical research program that would improve our understanding of 
private and public enforcement and the relationship between the two. In Sec. IV. I suggest the 
outlines of such a program. It is unlikely, however, that even highly motivated and well-
subsidized analysts will be able to come to firm conclusions any time soon about the contribution 
of class actions to regulatory enforcement, much less the circumstances under which private 
regulatory enforcement class actions have a net benefit to society.60 As a result we should be 
cautious about accepting the sweeping assertions offered by participants in public policy debates 
about the net benefit (or cost) of using private class actions for regulatory enforcement, relative 
to public enforcement. 
The remainder of this Section presents the available data on the number and type of 
regulatory enforcement class actions, their outcomes and the relationship between private class 
actions and public enforcement. Although these data do not answer the ultimate cost-benefit 
question regarding regulatory enforcement class actions, they do provide some insights into the 
ways that class action procedures are implemented on the ground. Each of the topical sub-
sections begins with a summary of the findings, which is followed by detailed information for 
the jurisdictions for which information is available. 
A. Frequency and Type of  Class Actions 
In many jurisdictions that have adopted class actions, only a handful of cases have been 
filed,61 at least in part for reasons discussed supra in Sec. II.  If policymakers in those 
jurisdictions intended for class actions to help regulate the economy, it is unlikely that the 
procedure is doing so.  In a few jurisdictions, available data indicate more frequent use of the 
procedure.  The only comprehensive national data are for Australia, compiled by Morabito under 
a grant from the Australian Research Council, and for Israel, compiled by Klement et al. for the 
Israeli courts. Both Australia’s and Israel’s class action rules are quite similar to U.S. Rule 23, 
although their legal financing rules are more restrictive than U.S. financing rules. Australia’s 
federal class action statute became effective in 1992, Israel’s general class action statute became 
                                                            
authors wrote that there was no ongoing public effort to collect statistics on class action filings or outcomes in 
their jurisdictions. Nicholas Pace cited data from special reports on U.S. class actions that are discussed in this 
Section infra; Vince Morabito reported that he was in the midst of collecting comprehensive data on Australian 
class actions collected under a grant from the Australian Research Council, supplemented by contributions from 
corporate and plaintiff law firms, and Australia’s leading third-party litigation financer, Bentham IMF. The results of 
his research are discussed in this Section as well. 
60 While the challenges are daunting, they are perhaps no less daunting than the situation we faced some 50 years 
ago with regard to the effectiveness of health care delivery. Today, although health policy analysts are far from 
knowing everything needed to make rational policy choices they are able to provide policy-makers with some 
evidence of what “works” and what does not, and what the costs and benefits are of major health interventions.  
61 Hensler, Hodges &Tulibacka, (2009) supra note 15. 
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effective in 2007.62 Less complete data are available for the United States, where the current 
version of the federal class action rule was adopted in 1966. 
The Australian, Israeli and U.S. data cover different time periods and are derived from 
different sources; as a result, they are not precisely comparable. Taken together, the data indicate 
that even jurisdictions with quite similar class action regimes may have quite different 
experiences with regard to the use of class actions. Australian class actions are as rare as the 
platypus, while in Israel the most recent per capita filing rate was higher than the per capita rate 
in the same year for all civil litigation in California state courts.63 Although economic class 
actions predominate in all three jurisdictions, the balance of large value cases (e.g. securities and 
other financial investment class actions) and smaller value cases (e.g. consumer protection class 
actions) differs dramatically among them. Whether this difference reflects differences in legal 
financing rules, judicial interpretation of class action rules, or other factors is not clear; most 
likely, multiple factors are at work, including perhaps the maturity (or lack thereof) of the rule 
itself.  
1. Number of class action filings 
From 1992 – 2014, 329 class actions were filed in Australia’s federal courts, an average 
of about 15 class actions per year. 64 The average number of annual filings was somewhat higher 
during the first half of the program’s life and somewhat lower during the more recent half.  The 
largest number of class actions filed in a single year was 31, in 1998, the seventh year of 
program operations; the smallest was 4, in 2005, the fourteenth year of program operations. The 
total number of filings in the most recent reporting year 2013-2014 was 19. From 1992 – 2008, 
annual class action filings amounted to about one percent of total annual civil case filings.65  
                                                            
62 Some states in Australia also authorize class actions. The data presented in this essay relate solely to federal 
class actions, which far outnumber those brought under state law. Prior to Israel’s adoption of a general class 
action statute, class actions were authorized in a number of substantive statutes. For a description of the Israeli 
statute, see Amichai Magen & Peretz Segal, “Israel,” in Hensler, Hodges & Tulibacka, 2009, supra note 15. 
63 But California does not have the highest per capita rate of ordinary civil litigation; a dozen states’ rates of 
ordinary civil litigation are higher than the Israeli rate of class action filings. National Center for State Courts, 
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, 2012 Trial Court Civil Caseload, available at 
http://www.ncsc.org/Sitecore/Content/Microsites/PopUp/Home/CSP/CSP_Intro. 
64 Vince Morabito, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AUSTRALIA’S CLASS ACTION REGIMES, THIRD REPORT, Australian 
Research Council, November 2014, ssrn-id2523275, at 2. In Australia as in the United States, a single event or 
alleged legal violation may result in multiple duplicative class action filings, which are usually consolidated by the 
court. Morabito reports that about 50 percent of Australian federal class actions were associated with other class 
action filings. These 165 lawsuits were a result of 52 disputes. Id. at 3. Because Morabito reports most of his data 
on a filing basis, rather than on a dispute basis, I have used the total filing numbers in this essay. 
65 Vince Morabito, Australian Research Counsel, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AUSTRALIA’S CLASS ACTION REGIMES: 
LITIGATION FUNDERS, COMPETING CLASS ACTIONS, OPT OUT RATES, Victorian Class Actions and Class 
Representatives 16 (2010), available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Vince%20Morabito%202nd%20Report.pdf. 
Morabito’s more recent 2014 report does not report the ratio of class action filings to total civil filings.  
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Israel’s annual class action filings have increased dramatically, from 28 in 2007 to 820 in 
2012, the last year for which data are available. In all, a total of 2004 class action lawsuits were 
filed over this period. Filings in each year have increased substantially, relative to the preceding 
year, suggesting that the latest number is a better indicator of present use of the class action 
process than an average computed over several years.66  
There is no comprehensive database of U.S. class action complaints. Using a variety of 
incomplete data sources for the mid-2000s, Hensler estimated that there were approximately 
6500 class action complaints filed in U.S. state and federal courts in 2005, about one percent of 
all civil case filings.67   
Table 2 assembles these data, along with the total population and GDP of each country. 
These three jurisdictions share features that we would expect to facilitate class actions, including 
broad scope, less restrictive standing rules, availability of money damages and opt-out 
provisions. The (estimated) per capita rate of annual class action filings in all three jurisdictions 
is very small, with Israel, perhaps surprisingly, in the lead.  
 
Table 2 
Number of Annual Class Action Filings, with Population and GDP 
 
COUNTRY # of Class Action 
Filings (Year) 
Population Per Cap* GDP 
Australia68     19  (2013)  23 M <.00 1 T (USD) 
Israel69   820  (2012)    7  M   .53 209 B (USD) 
United States70 6500  (2005) 298 M   .02 12 T (USD) 
*Per capita estimates are mine. 
  
2. Composition of the Class Action Caseload 
Since citizens may bring class actions to challenge government policy as well as to seek 
redress from private economic actors, to understand what role class action litigation might be 
playing in regulating the economy we need to disaggregate the numbers. Disaggregated court 
statistics are in even shorter supply than total filing data. Morabito devised a coding scheme to 
distinguish the class action filings in his comprehensive Australian database by type of claim.  
                                                            
66 Alon Klement, Keren Weinshall, Yifat Treblus & Roni Avissar-Sade, CLASS ACTIONS IN ISTRAEL – AN EMPIRICAL 
PERSPECTIVE, 2014, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/Research%20Division/doc%5C25122014.pdf. 
67 Deborah Hensler, “Using Class Actions to Enforce Consumer Protection Law,” in Geraint Howells, Ian Ramsay & 
Thomas Wilhelmsson, eds.  HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER LAW (2010). Hensler’s 
estimate is for non-duplicative filings. 
68 Morabito, 2014, supra note 64. 
69 Klemont et al., 2014, supra note 66. 
70 Hensler, 2010, supra note 67. 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT NOT FOR CITATION OR DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR 
 
21 
 
Israel’s statute specifies the types of claims that may be brought as class actions, which yields 
disaggregated information. Hensler et al., 2000, report disaggregated statistics from a data 
collection effort in 1995-1996 that relied on a combination of reported judicial decisions and a 
content analysis of mass media. Table 3 assembles these data. Because the distribution of 
Australian class actions filings by case type differed substantially between the earlier and later 
periods and because neither of these periods is identical to the period for which there are Israeli 
and U.S. data, Table 3 reports Australian data from 1992-2003 and from 2003-2014 separately.71  
  
                                                            
71 The court reporting years in Australia begin and end in March. The data shown in Table 3 are for non-
overlapping periods. 
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Table 3 
      Composition of Class Action Caseload in Australia and the United States 
 
TYPE OF 
CLAIM 
AUSTRALIA ISRAEL UNITED 
STATES  
Source72 Morabito, 
2014 
Morabito, 
2014 
Klemont et al., 
2014 
Hensler et al., 
2000 
Time Period 1992-2003 2003-2014 2006-2012 1995-1996 
 % % % % 
Securities, 
investment & 
other non-
consumer 
financial73 
17 30 2 19 
Consumer  6 13 77 25 
Anti-trust < 1 2 1 (Not reported) 
Product. 
Liability/ Mass 
Torts 
26 8 Na 9 
Employment 27 7 3 15 
Civil Rights74 < 1 3 1 14 
(Other) Claims 
Against 
Government 
18 1 14 11 
Other   6 11 2 7 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
     
 
In all three jurisdictions, class actions pertaining to economic behavior predominate. 
Securities class actions and other investment class actions constituted almost 20 percent of the 
cases in the early period in Australia and in the U.S. around the same time period, increasing to a 
full 30 percent in Australia in the later period.  Morabito attributes the shift in distribution in the 
Australian filings towards securities and investment cases in the last decade to the rise of third-
party litigation financing.75 By contrast, there have been few securities class actions in Israel. 
The larger fractions of consumer protection cases in Israel and the United States, relative to 
Australia, may reflect differences in expectations of fee awards among the three countries. 
                                                            
72 See text and footnotes for details. 
73 The 48 securities class actions brought in Australia’s federal courts from 1992-2014 included 9 brought by The 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission. See Welsh & Morabito, 2014, supra, note 25 at 48. 
74 The Israeli civil rights claims were brought against private parties; the U.S. civil rights category includes both 
claims against private parties and claims against the government. 
75 Morabito, 2014, supra, note 64 at 10. 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT NOT FOR CITATION OR DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR 
 
23 
 
Judges award fees in civil litigation in Israel, taking into account both actual expenditures and 
results achieved.76 In the United States, judges award fees in class actions (although not in 
ordinary civil litigation), taking similar factors into account. Australian lawyers are permitted to 
charge “no win, no lose” fees, but cannot charge fees based on damages obtained for their 
clients. The legislated fee regime has been modified by the introduction of third-party litigation 
financing but, as noted by Morabito, the financers prefer to invest in higher value securities and 
investment lawsuits. One reason for the relative disinclination for third-party financers to invest 
in consumer class actions is that the large number and wide dispersion of potential class 
members make it difficult to create “closed” classes of individuals who have each contracted 
with the financer to fund the action, in exchange for a share of their individual winnings.77 
Is there an optimal number of regulatory enforcement class action filings, relative to 
population size or economic productivity, that we might use as a benchmark for evaluating the 
frequency and distribution of regulatory class actions in Australia, Israel, the United States or 
other jurisdictions? Without information on the frequency of violations of different types of 
economic regulations, the absolute numbers of cases do not allow us to assess whether there is 
too much class action litigation, too little or just the right amount, either generally or in specific 
substantive domains. This “missing denominator” problem bedevils all efforts to evaluate the 
frequency of civil lawsuits, both individual and collective,78 and contradicts the rhetoric of 
hyper-litigation promoted by corporate lobbyists.  
B. The Question of  Merit 
In assessing the value of private class actions for enforcing economic regulations, we 
need to know both the rate of “false negatives” – violations that were justiciable but did not lead 
to litigation – and “false positives” – litigations that had no basis in law or facts. Because no one 
knows the number of violations of economic regulations that go unchallenged by litigation, there 
is no way to calculate false negatives associated with different legal regimes. But a primary 
criticism of private regulatory enforcement class actions is that a substantial fraction – perhaps 
even the overwhelming majority – are frivolous or spurious – i.e. “false positives.” How to 
define frivolous litigation is a vexed question: one person’s frivolous claim is often another’s 
legitimate pursuit of a legal right to a remedy.  Trial verdicts arguably provide a measure of 
merit,79 but in many jurisdictions a majority of claims never reach trial.80 In common law 
jurisdictions, however, a significant fraction of civil lawsuits are resolved before trial, by judicial 
                                                            
76 Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher, & Issi Roen-Zvi, “Attorneys’ Fees in a Loser-Pays System,” 162 U. Penn. L. Rev. 
1619 (2014). 
77 Email communication with John Walker, co-founder and executive director of Bentham/IMF Australia. 
78 Connor, supra, note 32 makes the same point regarding analyzing the effectiveness of public enforcement of 
anti-competition law.  
79 Even trial verdicts are not perfect measures of merit, as reflected in legal rules that permit (sometimes multiple) 
appeals. 
80 In the United States only a tiny fraction of civil lawsuits are tried to verdict. See Marc Galanter, “The Vanishing 
Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts,” 1 J. Empir. Leg. St. 459 (2004)  
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decisions. In the absence of other information about a claim, how a case was disposed pre-trial 
may provide a measure of merit.  
In U.S. law, a dismissal on substantive grounds81 should be granted when there is no 
plausible set of facts that would support the plaintiff’s legal claim (and therefore further 
litigation, including discovery, is not worthwhile). A summary judgment is a judicial holding that 
there is no material dispute over the facts (and therefore no need for a full-blown trial) and that 
the movant wins as a matter of law.82  Summary judgment motions may be brought by any party, 
usually after discovery has taken place, but have become a favored tool of defendants.  Rates of 
dismissals and summary judgment may therefore be treated as indicators that a claim lacked 
merit, at least in the view of the court. In contrast, a settlement – negotiated at their discretion by 
plaintiffs and defendants – may be treated as an indicator that the claim was meritorious enough 
that a defendant was unwilling to try its luck at trial. Using dismissal, summary judgment and 
settlement rates as proxies for merit is contestable: in the United States, both legal scholars and 
practitioners have fiercely criticized the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation of the legal standards 
for dismissal and summary judgment,83 and many U.S. defendants – particularly class action 
defendants – claim that they are “blackmailed” into settling non-meritorious cases because of the 
risks associated with going to trial.84  
Finally, in U.S. federal and state courts a large fraction of ordinary civil suits are 
“voluntarily dismissed,” meaning that the plaintiffs dropped their claims. In some instances, this 
indicates that the parties agreed to settle out of court without any judicial intervention; in other 
instances the plaintiff simply decided not to go forward, which could reflect a reassessment of 
the value of their legal claim or a lack of resources. Court records never distinguish between 
these outcomes. 
Data on how ordinary civil lawsuits are disposed are patchy in all jurisdictions. The 
United States and Australia are the only two jurisdictions for which there are publicly available 
data on the patterns of disposition in class actions.  As discussed in more detail infra, the 
                                                            
81 In the United States, a case may be dismissed “without prejudice,” which means that the plaintiff may amend 
and resubmit the complaint. In some complex litigations, the initial complaint is amended multiple times as the 
litigation progresses. In some instances, a claim is dismissed because the court does not have jurisdiction, the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute the case in a timely manner or for some other technical matter. Unless reversed on 
appeal, these dismissals generally terminate the claim, at least in the court that dismissed it. 
82 For a discussion of the evolution of doctrine on motions to dismiss and summary judgment, see Suja Thomas, 
“The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly,” 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 
15 (2010).   
83 Id. 
84 On claims of “blackmail settlements” and lack of evidence to support these claims, see Hensler, 2013, supra note 
13. An added problem is that there is not universal agreement on how to calculate settlement rates from court 
data. Whether or not a non-adjudicatory disposition should be termed a settlement turns out to be a complicated 
conceptual as well as empirical problem. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate 
and Why Should We Care?  6 J. Empir. Leg. Studies 111 (2009). 
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distributions of class actions by disposition type are fairly similar for the two jurisdictions. A 
substantial fraction of class complaints are dropped or withdrawn by plaintiffs, and a substantial 
fraction are settled by negotiation between the class and defendants. When cases are not dropped 
or settled they are likely to be disposed of by pretrial judicial decisions in favor of defendants.85 
In Australia, but not the United States (at least recently), a small fraction of cases are disposed by 
trial or post-trial verdict in favor of class members.  
The distribution of class actions by disposition type belie the frequent assertion in the 
United States (and in debates over adopting class action procedures elsewhere) that all class 
actions settle because it is too risky for defendants to pursue them (i.e. “blackmail settlements”). 
In fact, in the United States, in several of the samples for which disposition type data are 
available, most cases did not yield compensation or other relief for the class.86 In the last decade, 
Australian class actions have been more likely to produce remedies for the class. In both 
jurisdictions, the available data suggest that class actions comprising higher value claims, which 
are more likely to be litigated by experienced and well-financed class counsel (e.g. securities 
class actions), are more likely to reach either a pretrial court judgment or a settlement than class 
actions that typically comprise smaller value claims. The latter are more likely to be dropped or 
to end with a settlement with an individual putative class representative, effectively ending any 
class action exposure for the defendant.87 
Multiple stories about the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement class actions might be 
told about these data. If many class complaints that do not yield remedies for the class are non-
meritorious, then there is no offsetting benefit for the costs they impose on defendants, and 
ultimately on consumers as well. But if a significant fraction of these unsuccessful class 
complaints were abandoned by class counsel because of insufficient resources or because of 
legal standards that systematically advantage defendants to the detriment of plaintiffs, then 
                                                            
85 In Australia, where there is no requirement for class certification, pretrial decisions favorable to defendants 
include withdrawal of class status from the litigation. This usually occurs in response to a defendant’s motion 
challenging the plaintiffs’ statutory right to proceed as a class. 
86 The fact that in the United States, the majority of putative class actions are not formerly certified as class actions 
unless and until they are settled is the likely source of the perception that “all class actions settle.” Recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions requiring extensive evidentiary hearings prior to class certification – arguably shifting 
battles from the summary judgment stage to the certification decision – may change this pattern. 
87 Fitzpatrick’s data, which are limited to class actions that settled, indicate that consumer class actions are more 
likely to be certified for settlement purposes only (so-called “settlement classes”) than class actions generally.  
Eight-five percent of consumer class actions that settled were certified for settlement purposes only, as compared 
to 68 percent in the total sample. Calculated by me from data presented in Brian Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of 
Class Action Settlements and their Fee Awards, 7 J. Empirical Legal St. 811 (2010) at 818. Virtually all Israeli class 
action settlements (the majority of which relate to consumer protection) are approved by judges before 
certification. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Yair Sagy, “Courts As Organizations: The Drive for Efficiency and the 
Regulation of Class Actions,” 2015 (on file with author). Critics of U.S. settlement class actions argue that the fact 
that they are certified for settlement purposes only weakens class members’ position vis a vis defendants and 
leads to “sweetheart” settlements. See Hensler et al., supra, note 8, at 31-36.  
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society may be deprived of the potential benefits of a private regulatory enforcement regime. The 
available data do not allow us to choose between these stories – or indeed other stories. 
1. The United States 
There is no comprehensive database on class action dispositions in the United States,88 
but four studies of select types of class actions, using diverse data sources, report such 
distributional data.  Table 4 presents these data. The first study, conducted by RAND, was a 
survey of state and federal consumer class actions against insurers, based on insurer records.89 
The second, conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, the research arm of the U.S. federal 
courts, was a study of diversity class actions filed in federal court, comprising contract and tort 
class actions, before the 2005 passage of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).90 The third 
study, conducted by the Meyer Brown law firm for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce using data 
from litigation reporters, dealt with federal employment and consumer class actions filed in 
2009.91 The fourth study, conducted by Cornerstone Research using data compiled by the 
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, pertains to federal securities class actions. This 
results of this study, presented in the final two panels of Table 4, permit us to distinguish the 
patterns of disposition by whether the class representative was an individual or institutional 
                                                            
88 The burgeoning empirical scholarship on private class actions focuses almost exclusively on settled cases that 
resulted in published opinions, excluding any reference to other pre-trial dispositions. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher 
& Kristina Vost, Measuring the Value of Class and Collective Action Employment Settlements: A Preliminary 
Assessment, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 768 (2009); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Attorneys’ Fees and 
Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. Empirical Legal St. 248 (2010); Fitzpatrick, 2010, supra note 
87; Donald Hawthorne, Recent Trends in Federal Antitrust Class Action Cases, Developments: Antitrust 58 (2010) 
reports the outcomes of only 19 disposed cases from a sample of 121 class actions filed between 2007 and 2009 at 
61.  Only 24 cases had reached the stage of motions to dismiss at the time of the analysis; of these, half were 
decided in favor of the plaintiff and half in favor of the defendant. Id., at 60.  Greg Wrobel, Michael Waters & 
Joshua Dunn, Judicial Application of the Twombly/Iqbal Plausibility Standard in Antitrust Cases, 26 Antitrust 8 
(2011),  reports that from 2007-201 appellate and district court judges granted 74 percent of motions to dismiss 
antitrust claims and denied 41 percent.  As indicated by the fact that the numbers sum to more than 100, in a 
single ruling a judge may grant some claims and deny others; also, when judges grant motions to dismiss they may 
do so without prejudice allowing plaintiffs to re-file.  Wrobel et al. do not distinguish between rulings that were 
dispositive and those that were not dispositive.   
89 Nicholas Pace et al., INSURANCE CLASS ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2007), SUMMARY, Table 5.1 at xxii.  The 
data are from a non-random survey of mostly large property-casualty insurers.  Two- thirds of the suits involved 
consumer complaints arising out of   automobile insurance policies.   
90 Emery Lee & Thomas Willging, IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE TWO’S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS, Federal Judicial 
Center (2008).  The data are a random sample of CAFA-eligible putative class actions filed in federal court and not 
remanded to state court, prior to the passage of CAFA, which expanded federal court jurisdiction for these sorts of 
class actions. Diversity cases would include consumer protection and employment class actions, inter alia, but 
would not include securities or anti-trust (cartel) class actions. 
91 Mayer Brown LLP, DO CLASS ACTIONS BENEFIT CLASS MEMBERS?  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CLASS ACTIONS, 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform (2013).  The data were compiled from two commercial 
litigation reporters that follow class litigation.  The final sample excluded a small number of state court class 
actions.  The final sample of 169 cases included 14 percent of class actions still pending. Id., Fn 81.  The data I 
present exclude those cases. 
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investor.92  Only one of the four studies includes class actions filed in state courts, whose 
outcomes may differ significantly from federal class action outcomes.  All of the data are from 
the 2000s, but the exact dates differ.  This is an important caveat as U.S. class action 
jurisprudence has evolved dramatically over this time period.93 All of these studies identified 
cases in which class action complaints were filed, typically termed “putative class actions.” 
Filing a class action complaint is the first step in the litigation process and does not assure that 
the lawsuit will ultimately be certified and resolved in class form.  
 
Table 4 
Distribution of U.S. Class Actions by Disposition Type, Selected Studies 
 
 
 
 
Insurance 
Consumer Class 
Actions  
(State & 
Federal) 
 
Contract and Tort 
Class Actions 
(Federal) 
Consumer & 
Employment Class 
Actions 
(Federal) 
Securities Class 
Actions With 
Institutional Investor 
Lead Plaintiffs 
(Federal) 
Securities Class Actions 
Without Institutional 
Investor Lead Plaintiffs 
(Federal) 
SOURCE94 Pace et al., 2007 Lee & Willging, 2008 Mayer Brown, 2013 Cornerstone, 2013 Cornerstone, 2013 
STUDY PERIOD 1993-2002 2003-2005 2009 1996-2010 1996-2010 
 % % % % % 
DISPOSITION TYPE      
Voluntary 
dismissal95 
47  55 35 2 9 
Dismissal or 
summary 
judgment 
                         37   29 
 
31 43 41 
Class settlement                          12 13 33 55 50 
Trial                            1 0 0 -- -- 
Other 3 4 0 -- -- 
SAMPLE SIZE 96 564 161 145 767 1720 
 
                                                            
92 Cornerstone Research, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS 2013 MID-YEAR ASSESSMENT (2013), Figures 15 & 16.  
Ten percent of the cases had reached summary judgment at the time of the analysis; I have included them in the 
pretrial adjudication category even though it is possible that some of these would have produced a ruling in favor 
of the plaintiff that would ultimately provoke settlement.  The data are a subset of the total database compiled 
and maintained by the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse which includes 3641 federal securities class 
actions filed between January 1, 1996 and June 30, 2013.  Dismissal rates vary over time.  Over the period 1996-
2006 for which all or virtually all cases have been resolved the highest dismissal rate was 48 percent and the 
lowest dismissal rate was 28 percent.  The Clearinghouse does not report any settlements between individual 
plaintiffs and defendants; whether such outcomes do not occur or simply do not make their way into the database 
is unclear. 
93 Robert Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. (2013) 
94 See text and footnotes for details. 
95 Because they relied on insurer records rather than court records, the RAND researchers were able to distinguish 
cases that were resolved by individual settlements with putative class representatives and other voluntary 
dismissals. About 20 percent of the insurance consumer class actions were resolved by individual settlements. 
96 Sample sizes for all studies removed duplicative filings that are common in U.S. class action litigation. 
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Table 4 discloses sharp differences in the rates of different types of disposition of U.S. 
regulatory enforcement class actions across case types.  The samples in which small value claims 
most likely predominated had higher rates of voluntary dismissals without a judicial disposition 
than the securities class action samples, which typically would involve larger value claims. There 
are different possible interpretations of this pattern.  Perhaps the types of law firms that bring 
small value claim class actions are poorer judges of the legal and factual strength of claims than 
the more specialized law firms that bring securities class actions, leading to higher rates of 
voluntary dismissal among the former, compared to the latter. Perhaps the firms that prosecute 
smaller value claims give up more easily than securities class action firms because they have less 
financial wherewithal to persevere against deep pocket corporate defendants. Or perhaps firms 
that prosecute small value claim class actions have a scatter-shot business strategy of filing many 
class suits in the hope that a few will succeed.  
Voluntary dismissals do not indicate how judges assessed the merit of class action 
complaints (although they likely reflect the parties’ expectations of judicial assessments). Table 
4 shows that pretrial judicial disposition rates varied from about 30 percent for the samples in 
which small value claims likely predominated to around 40 percent for the larger value securities 
class actions. Putting aside voluntary dismissals, the federal consumer and employment class 
actions filed in 2009 and the securities class actions were about as likely to be resolved by a 
pretrial judicial disposition as to be resolved by settlement. It is tempting to conclude that at least 
in these samples there were equal fractions of non-meritorious and meritorious claims. If so, then 
the insurance class action sample (which included state court class actions) and the pre-CAFA 
sample of federal contract and tort class actions might be viewed as including a higher 
proportion of non-meritorious claims.  
2. Australia 
Morabito, 2014 reports the distribution of class actions in Australia by disposition type 
for 1992 -2003 and for 2003-2014 (see Table 5)97.  There was a lower rate of voluntary 
dismissals (withdrawals by plaintiffs) and higher rates of both pre-trial adjudications in favor of 
defendants and settlements in the later period, compared to the earlier period. Recall that there 
was a shift in the composition of the class action caseload between these two periods: in the later 
period, the caseload included a larger fraction of security, investment and other larger value 
financial claims, compared to the earlier period (see Table 3). The shift in the distribution of 
disposition types may reflect this change in caseload composition: as we saw in the U.S. data 
(see Table 4), voluntary dismissals occur less frequently in class actions with higher value 
claims.   
                                                            
97 Morabito, 2014, supra, note 64. The court reporting years in Australia begin and end in March. The data shown 
in Table 5 are for non-overlapping periods. I have collapsed the categories in Morabito’s report to facilitate 
comparisons with U.S. data.  
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Table 5 
Distribution of Australian Federal Class Actions by Disposition Type,  
1992-2003 & 2003-201498 
 
 1992-2003 2003-2014 
 % % 
DISPOSITION TYPE   
Voluntary Dismissal (proceeding discontinued by class 
representative or discontinued as a class action) 
 
23 
      
       16     
Discontinued as a class action by the court 
9 
 
 
8 
Pre-trial adjudication for Defendant (Application 
summarily dismissed) 
                     9              
                           
 
 
14                             
Class Settlement 40 56 
Judicial Decision Favoring Class at Trial or Post-Trial 
8 
 
4 
Other 11 2 
TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES   
 
Previous analyses by Morabito also found differences in the distribution of dispositions 
type by court district (region), and by the law firm that represented the class.99  The settlement 
rate for class actions represented by Australia’s two leading plaintiff class action firms (68 
percent) was more than twice the rate for all other class actions (26 percent). None of the leading 
firms’ cases were dismissed by the court, compared to almost a third of all other cases.100 These 
differences in rates of settlement and pretrial dismissals may reflect both differences in expertise 
with regard to claims assessment and availability of adequate resources to vigorously prosecute 
class actions. 
  
                                                            
98 Morabito, 2014, supra, note 64. The court reporting years in Australia begin and end in March. The data shown 
in Table 5 are for non-overlapping periods. 
99 Vince Morabito, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AUSTRALIA’S CLASS ACTION REGIMES: FIRST REPORT: CLASS ATIONS 
FACTS AND FIGURES (2009) available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Australia_Empircial_Morabito_2009_Dec.pdf 
100 Id. at 34-35. 
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C. Outcomes 
To evaluate the deterrence potential of regulatory enforcement class actions, we need to 
know not only the rate of claiming, relative to violations, and the proportions of false negatives 
and false positives; we need also to know the direct and indirect costs class actions impose on 
defendants. Direct costs include payments to class members when the class prevails at trial and 
when defendants negotiate settlements, plus defendants’ legal expenses for all cases, including 
those in which they prevail and those in which they negotiate settlements or lose at trial. (In 
loser-pay regimes, we need to take fee-shifts into account when calculating defendants’ legal 
expenses.) Direct costs also include the expense of class action notices (required for opt-out class 
actions) and the costs of distributing settlement funds, elements that are usually included in the 
aggregate settlement value approved by U.S. judges. In addition, some class action settlements 
include injunctive relief, changes in policies and practices that also impose costs on defendants, 
and in the United States, some settlements include cy pres remedies – for example, contributions 
to consumer education or automotive safety programs. (Sometimes cy pres remedies are paid in 
lieu of cash payments to class members, either because it would be too expensive to try to locate 
all class members or because some class members do not claim amounts owed them. In the latter 
case the cy pres amount may equal the residual left in the fund.101) Indirect costs include 
reputational losses, which may affect market share, and effects on capital markets, which often 
respond dramatically to litigation events. 
Given concern about the costs of litigation in all jurisdictions that adopt or consider 
adopting class action procedures, it is remarkable how little data there are on aggregate costs to 
defendants. Because in many modern legal regimes most lawsuits settle, and most jurisdictions 
regard settlements as a private matter between plaintiffs and defendants, it is usually difficult to 
obtain data on the outcomes of civil lawsuits. Class actions are an exception to this observation: 
because most jurisdictions that have adopted class actions require judges to approve settlements 
between the class and defendants after a public hearing, settlement provisions usually are a 
matter of public record.  As a result of recent empirical scholarship in the United States relying 
on these public records, we know something about the distribution of aggregate settlement value 
in U.S. class actions, by type of case. Because under U.S. class actions rules, judges award 
attorney fees, we also know the relationship between the amount of fees awarded by U.S. judges 
and aggregate settlement value. But how much defendants pay to settle class action lawsuits 
often depends on the amount of individual remedies and the design of the settlement, which 
determines the number of class members who ultimately collect what defendants have committed 
                                                            
101 Because cy pres remedies do not directly benefit class members and may have a tenuous relationship to the 
subject of the class action they are a subject of controversy. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (Statement by C.J. 
Roberts concurring with decision to deny certiorari but suggesting the U.S. Supreme Court should take up the 
legality of cy pres remedies in class actions in a future case).  However, from an enforcement perspective, cy pres 
remedies assure that the actual deterrence value of the lawsuit equals the intended value. 
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to pay. These data are rarely made public,102 although anecdotal data indicate that in some class 
actions very few class members come forward to collect their share of the settlement.   
As a result, what we know about what the costs class actions impose on defendants is 
woefully incomplete. The available data indicate that the aggregate values of judicially-approved 
settlements vary substantially across different categories of claims (e.g. securities fraud versus 
labor wage-and-hours), from just a few million dollars, to hundreds of millions or more. The 
billion dollar settlements that make the news are rare. Generally, the attorneys collect about 25 
percent of class action settlements in the United States, although the percentage awarded declines 
as the settlement amount increases.103 For very large classes, estimated individual remedies are 
relatively modest, suggesting that defendants set a cap on the total amount they are willing to pay 
to settle a class action and are not willing to increase it proportionately with the size of the class. 
Nonetheless, there are class actions where the estimated average individual remedy amounts to 
thousands or even tens of thousands of dollars.  
As we would expect, the available information on take-up rates indicates that when 
proffered individual remedies are very small, so too is the fraction of class members who come 
forward to claim it. When settlements include provisions to automatically pay out remedies to 
eligible class members – for example, by crediting continuing customers’ accounts – the 
aggregate payout by defendants will equal the aggregate amount approved by the judge. When 
unclaimed settlement amounts are distributed pro rata to class members who did claim or paid 
out in the form of cy pres remedies, defendants will also pay the formally-approved amount. But 
absent such provisions the defendants may well pay far less than the amount the judge approved. 
Some settlements include injunctive relief as well as money damages, and some judges take 
injunctive relief into account when awarding attorney fees, but we lack systematic data on the 
proportion of cases that produce injunctive remedies and their value. In sum, we know that in 
some class actions, defendants pay far less than the “advertised” settlement amount, but we do 
not have enough information to calculate the real expected value of class actions generally, or of 
specific types of class actions.104 
Finally, we know virtually nothing about what defendants pay their own counsel to 
contest and resolve class action litigation. 
1. Approved Settlement Amounts 
Using unpublished as well as published federal court opinions from 2005 and 2006 and 
other sources, Fitzpatrick has assembled the most comprehensive database of federal class action 
                                                            
102 See, e.g., See Nicholas Pace & William Rubenstein, HOW TRANSPARENT ARE CLASS ACTION OUTCOMES? 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE AVAILABILITY OF CLASS ACTION CLAIMS DATA, Rand Working Paper, July 2008 at 23. 
103 Eisenberg & Miller, 2010, supra note 88. 
104 Estimated these values is critical for third-party litigation financers, but the data they collect and the models 
they used to compute these estimates are proprietary. 
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settlements to date, 564 in all.105  The typical aggregate value of these federal class settlements, 
including attorney fee awards, was quite modest (a median of $5 million and a mean of $55 
million over the two-year study period).  Most settlements (89 percent) offered class members 
cash, sometimes along with other remedies; about one-quarter included declaratory or injunctive 
relief.  Mean settlement values varied substantially across case types.106 Commercial, securities 
and anti-trust class actions produced the highest values, with means of $112 million, $96 million 
and $60 million respectively.107  Other types of class actions yielded more modest settlement 
amounts.  Consumer and employment benefit class action settlements averaged $19 million and 
$14 million respectively.  Labor and employment (wage and hour) and civil rights class actions 
both averaged about $9 million.   
Attorney fee awards in these cases averaged about 25 percent of aggregate settlement 
amounts.  These percentages did not vary substantially across case types.  However, the 
percentage fee award was inversely correlated with the settlement value, dropping below 25 
percent for settlements valued above $10 million.  For settlements of $72.5 million of more, the 
average was 18 percent.  For settlements of one billion or more (9 cases), the average attorney 
fee awards was 13.7 percent of the total settlement value.108   
Data from small non-random samples of U.S. class actions also show variation in the 
aggregate value of class actions settlements by type of case.  In their study of state and federal 
consumer class actions against insurers, Pace at al., obtained aggregate settlement amounts for 36 
cases. The median aggregate settlement amount (including attorney fees) was $2.6 million and 
the mean was $12.8 million, in line with the smaller value federal class action settlements 
reported by Fitzpatrick.109 In their sample of 10 class actions, Hensler et al. found total 
settlement values ranging from $1.5 million (in a consumer dispute over cable fee charges) to $1 
billion (in a property damage class action arising out of defective polybutylene pipes).  The 
smallest approved settlement amount for a consumer class action was the $1.5 million in the 
cable fee litigation; the largest was $75.5 million (in a dispute over deceptive labeling of contact 
lenses). The mass tort class action settlements ranged in value from about $52 million (for a 
toxic exposure case) to $1 billion for the polybutylene property damage case.110 The only 
published data on the outcomes of Australian class actions is for 10 cases funded by third-party 
                                                            
105 Fitzpatrick, 2010, supra note 87.  
106 Fitzpatrick reports settlement values including attorney fee awards – that is, the total the defendant offered to 
pay to settle the class action. 
107 Robert Lande and Joshua Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 
U.S.F.L.Rev. 879 (2008), report higher medians and means for antitrust settlements. Id., Table 1 at 892. However 
their sample excluded settlements of less than $50 million. 
108 Although Fitzpatrick’s method had a higher likelihood of including all federal class action settlements during the 
study period, his findings generally track Eisenberg & Miller, 2010, supra, note 88.   
109 The researchers note that these relatively high median and mean estimates reflect a small number of 
settlements with less than 1000 class members. Id. at 53. 
110 Hensler et al., supra note 8, Appendix at 533-592. 
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litigation financers.  The average total settlement value of these class actions was $31 million, 
and the median was $8 million.111  
2. Amounts paid to class members  
Mayer Brown collected actual outcome data on 40 federal consumer class actions 
resolved in 2009.112Almost half of the settlements (18) were so-called “claims made” settlements 
meaning amounts not claimed by eligible class members were not paid by the defendants.  The 
researchers could only obtain data on the claims rates for these settlements in six of the cases.  In 
one of these six – an ERISA class action arising out of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme—
claimants stood to collect large sums; not surprisingly, virtually all of the class members 
submitted claims. In three of the remaining cases, one percent or fewer class members claimed 
compensation; in two, the claiming rate was about ten percent.113  Thirteen of the 40 settlements 
provided for automatic distribution of compensation to class members.  Such automatic 
distribution is feasible when the defendant can easily identify class members, such as employees, 
insurance or telecommunications subscribers, or others with whom defendants have contractual 
relationships. In two of the three automatic distribution settlements that Mayer Brown identified 
as consumer class actions, class members received modest to substantial cash payments; in a 
third they received non-cash benefits of uncertain value.114  The remaining nine class actions 
settled for injunctive relief or cy pres remedies.  Although Mayer Brown derides the value of the 
injunctive relief they describe,115 others might disagree with their assessment.  
In their study of consumer class actions against insurers, Pace et al. were able to 
determine distribution rates (including cash payments and credits to subscribers’ accounts) for 43 
percent of the settlements they identified (29 cases in all). The median distribution rate was 15 
percent, but because a few settlements had much higher take-up rates, the mean distribution rate 
was 45 percent. The median total payout (i.e. to all class members) was $500,000, but in 10 
percent of the settlements the total payout was $25,000 or less.116 
Hensler et al. attempted to collect actual outcome information for the 10 U.S. class 
actions they studied intensively but were unable to obtain it from any source in one of those 
                                                            
111 Vince Morabito, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AUSTRALIA’S CLASS ACTION REGIMES: SECOND REPORT (2010), 
available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Vince%20Morabito%202nd%20Report.pdf 
112 Mayer Brown, 2013, supra note 91 at 7.  For the distribution of this sample by disposition type, see Table 4, 
supra. 
113 Mayer Brown does not describe the substantive claims that gave rise to these class actions, nor the aggregate 
dollar value of the settlements approved by the court. 
114 Id.  at 12. 
115 Mayer Brown describes the nature of the injunctive relief for only 4 of the 9 cases they identify with such relief. 
Id. at 13-14. 
116 Pace et al., supra, note 89 at 55. The median total payout was calculated for 39 cases or 57 percent of the 
settled cases. 
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cases.117 In 6 of the remaining 9 cases, they found that class members had collected (or would 
likely collect) all or most of the settlement monies set aside for them.  In the remaining 3 cases 
they estimated that class members collected only about 30 percent of the total funds.  In one of 
those 3 cases, the amount not claimed by class members was paid by the defendant in the form of 
a cy pres award.  As a consequence, defendants paid the full amount of the settlement approved 
by the court in 7 of the 9 cases.  In one of the two remaining cases, Hensler et al., estimate that 
the defendant paid approximately 60 percent of the approved settlement value; in the other the 
defendant paid 23 percent.118    
Four of the six class action settlements for which Pace & Rubenstein were able to find 
information119  provided for automatic payment to class members. In one of the two remaining 
cases, twenty percent of class members completed the required claiming procedure; in the other 
four percent of class members claimed. However, in one of these cases, the settlement specified 
that unclaimed funds would be distributed to claimants on a pro rata basis, so the defendant 
ultimately paid the full negotiated amount; in the other, the defendant apparently paid a small 
fraction of the judicially approved value.120  
3. Injunctive relief 
Empirical analysts generally have not attempted to place a dollar value on the declaratory 
and injunctive relief included in some U.S. class action settlements, although some judges accede 
to class counsels’ urging them to do so in awarding attorney fees.121  Many empiricists ignore 
declaratory and injunctive remedies altogether.122  To date, there has been no systematic effort to 
analyze declaratory and injunctive remedies in private class actions.123  However, descriptions of 
                                                            
117 The settlement approved by the judge in that case contained no information about total settlement value.  The 
researchers were able to estimate how much money was ultimately collected by the class from other sources but it 
was impossible to compare this to the amount class counsel and defendants agreed to, and the latter declined to 
share that information with the researchers.  
118 Hensler et al. supra, note 8, Figure 15.1 at 425, Table 15.8 at 436 and Appendix material. 
119 Pace & Rubenstein, 2008, supra, note 102. 
120 Id., at 24. 
121 Fitzpatrick, 2010, supra, note 87, reports finding only a few instances of judges taking injunctive relief into 
account in calculating attorney fees.  In their earlier study, Hensler et al., 2000, supra, note 8, describe instances of 
such awards.  
122This inattention to declaratory and injunctive remedies contrasts sharply with the focus of previous scholars 
who viewed class actions as vehicles for social reform.  See, e.g. Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public 
Law Litigation,” 89  Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976); Martha Davis, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (1993); Owen Fiss, “The History of an Idea,” 78 Fordham L. Rev   1273 (2009-2010).  The 
contemporary disinterest in declaratory and injunctive remedies likely is a function of the empiricists’ discipline: 
most are economists or lawyers trained in law and economics who are unfamiliar with the qualitative research 
approaches that are most appropriate for studying non-monetary remedies. The advent of electronic dockets and 
commercial databases that extract data from them makes this sort of analysis more feasible than it was previously. 
123 Professor Margo Schlanger is in the course of compiling a database to support such analysis for civil rights 
litigation.  However, her first published article relying on this database addresses EEOC actions, not private class 
actions.  See Margo Schlanger and Pauline Kim, “The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Structural 
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outcomes in a small number of non-randomly selected class actions suggest that some regulatory 
enforcement suits do result in changes in policies and practices.  Examples of class actions that 
led to changes in employment or consumer-related practices include class actions brought by 
African-American employees against Texaco124 and Coca-Cola,125 and a class action brought by 
African-American customers against the Denny’s restaurant chain.126 Lande & Davis cite as 
significant non-monetary remedies included in a sample of 40 federal antitrust class action 
settlements, natural gas price reductions, elimination of restrictions on insurance policies, 
elimination of caps on salaries of college sports coaches, and changes in credit card transaction 
policies that allegedly resulted in large cost savings for retailers.127  Five of the ten class actions 
that Hensler et al. studied intensively resulted in changes in consumer practices or product 
characteristics, although some of the changes occurred after the litigation began but before it was 
resolved.  In two additional cases, changes occurred as a result of related parallel litigation. 
Examples of changes included revising late fee provisions and changing credit finance practices 
to comply with state law, changing product labeling and changing product design.  Two cases led 
to changes in state law.128 Mayer Brown report that settlements in nine of the forty consumer and 
employment class actions they studied intensively included injunctive relief. Although they 
                                                            
Reform of the American Workplace,” University of Michigan Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Research 
Paper No. 340, August 2013. 
124 Roberts v. Texaco, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23848 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1997). The employees charged Texaco 
with discrimination in promotion and pay policies.  In the settlement approved by the court Texaco agreed to 
establish an independent task force to monitor anti-discrimination and diversity in employment practices and 
require diversity training, as well as to award a one-time 10% salary increase to current African-American 
employees, in addition to creating a $115 million cash fund.  See “Roberts v. Texaco,” Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & 
Grossman, LLP, available at http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00081. See also Bari-Ellen Roberts and Jack White, 
ROBERTS VS. TEXACO: A TRUE STORY OF RACE AND CORPORATE AMERICA (1999). 
125 Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685 (N.D. Ga. 2001) African-American employees charged Coca-Cola with 
discrimination in promotion and pay policies.  In the settlement approved by the court Coca-Cola agreed to reform 
its employment policies with regard to minorities and to establish an independent panel to monitor its hiring and 
promotion practices, as well as to create a $156 million fund to compensate employees who had been denied 
promotion.  Media coverage highlighted Coke’s agreement to accept whatever changes in employment policies 
regarding minorities that the panel might recommend. Greg Winter, “Coca-Cola Settles Racial Bias Suit,” New York 
Times,  November 17, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/17/business/coca-cola-settles-racial-
bias-case.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
126 Dyson v. Flagstar Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22685 (D. Md. July 17, 1996).  African-American customers sued 
Denny’s and its parent Flagstar Corporation for discriminatory practice that includes denials of service and 
derogatory remarks.  In addition to establishing a $54 million cash fund to compensate complaining customers, the 
defendant agreed to change its practices and to hire an outside civil rights lawyer to monitor its compliance with 
the agreed upon changes, in accordance with a consent decree negotiated by public and private lawyers. Steven 
Labaton, “Denny’s Restaurants to Pay $54 Million in Race Bias Suits, New York Times, May 25, 1994, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/25/us/denny-s-restaurants-to-pay-54-million-in-race-bias-
suits.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
127 Lande & Davis, 2008, supra, note 107 at 901-902. 
128 Hensler et al., 2000, supra, note 8 at 431-33. 
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dismiss the value of the changes in marketing practices they describe,129 others’ assessments 
might differ.  
4. Payments to plaintiff class counsel   
Because in U.S. class actions fees are awarded by judges, rather than set by contracts 
between class representatives (or class members) and plaintiff class action attorneys, what 
defendants pay class counsel usually is a matter of public record in the United States. Although 
fee awards are determined according to different rules in different judicial circuits, in practice, 
judges award fees as a percentage of settlements, and fee awards are included in the aggregate 
settlement values reported in the studies cited above. Aggregate settlement values approved by 
judges also include the costs to distribute the settlement fund and the costs of notice, tasks that in 
the United States are sub-contracted by plaintiff class counsel to specialized claims 
administration firms.  
5. Payments to defense counsel 
As there is no legal requirement for defendants to publicize their own litigation expenses, 
we also have little systematic information about this component of their costs.  Hensler et al. 
were able to obtain information about defendants’ litigation costs in just 3 of the 10 class actions 
they studied intensively.  The number varied dramatically, equaling class counsel fee awards in 
one case, about half of class counsel fees in another, and adding only a small percentage to total 
attorney costs in a third.130  
6. Indirect Costs 
Defendants’ indirect costs include effects on market share (for product and service 
providers and distributors) and effects on cost of capital.  Calculating indirect costs is 
complicated so it is unsurprising that we have little systematic information about this component 
of defendants’ costs.131   
D. Relationship of Private Class Actions to Public Enforcement 
Some class action critics argue that private class actions add little of value to public 
enforcement of market regulations. The critics argue that in many instances entrepreneurial class 
counsel bring actions where public regulators deemed or would deem no actionable violation 
took place, and in others – where public officials have undertaken regulatory activities – class 
counsel simply ride the coattails of public officials, driving up the costs of enforcement without 
                                                            
129 Mayer Brown, 2013, supra note 91 at 13-14. 
130 Hensler et al., supra note 8, Figure 15.8 and discussion at 440-441. 
131 For a review of the literature on indirect costs of mass tort litigation, which mostly proceeds in non-class 
aggregated form in the United States, see Deborah Hensler, “The Socio-Economics of Mass Torts: What We know, 
Don’t Know and Need to Know,” in Jennifer Arlen, ed., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF TORT (2013). 
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achieving commensurate benefits.132 Some responsive regulation theorists see private litigation 
focused on blame and monetary remedies as counter to efforts by enlightened public regulators 
to persuade regulated entities to comply by invoking moral norms before moving up the 
regulatory “pyramid” to criminal and civil sanctions.133   
To understand the consequences of private class actions for public enforcement we need 
to know the prevalence of different combinations of public and private enforcement, whether and 
to what extent public officials, private class action attorneys, class representatives and civil 
society coordinate their activities and what outcomes are achieved by them working separately 
and together. Capturing quantitative relationships between private and public enforcement 
requires synthesizing databases from different institutions. Investigating whether and how 
private and public actors work together requires qualitative research. Both are difficult to 
accomplish. However, the available data present a more complex picture of the relationship 
between private class actions and public enforcement than the critique assumes. Most research 
on the relationship of private to public actions has found scant evidence of coattail riding by 
private lawyers on public enforcement actions. However, this research leaves open the question 
of whether private actions with no public involvement are meritorious or non-meritorious. When 
public and private actions occur in parallel, they produce different but arguably complementary 
outcomes.  
Studies of public and private enforcement in France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
conducted during the past decade have consistently found that only a small percentage of private 
cartel damage actions – none of which were collective cases -- were “follow-on” actions to 
public actions.134 Most cartel cases involved corporate plaintiffs suing corporate defendants and 
a sizeable fraction of cases sought injunctive relief in addition to or instead of compensation. 
Private actions far outnumbered public actions in these countries suggesting that private 
enforcement in this domain is not dependent on the availability of a collective proceeding. 
A few studies have examined the relationship between outcomes in private class actions 
and public enforcement actions. Welsh and Morabito compared private securities class actions to 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) enforcement actions for 1992-
2012.135 They identified 48 securities class actions during the period, of which 9 were filed by 
ASIC on behalf of a class. In those 9 class actions, no private investor class actions were filed. 
The remaining 39 private class actions were divided roughly equally between suits where there 
                                                            
132 For discussion of arguments against private enforcement of market regulations focusing particularly on the 
insurance industry, see Pace et al., supra note 89 at 65 et. seq.  
133 Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2006, supra note 33. 
134 See, e.g., Sebastian Peyer, Germany – Comparative Private Enforcement & Consumer Redress in the EU, available 
at http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/final/Germany%20report.pdf; Muriel Chagny & Jean-Louis Fourgoux, 
Competition law, private enforcement and collective redress in France, 3-4, available at 
http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/final/France%20report.pdf. 
135 Supra, note 24 at 48, 52. I am grateful to Welsh and Morabito for providing details on ASIC action in successful 
and unsuccessful private class actions. 
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was also some ASIC activity (18) and suits in which there was no public action other than the 
private class action (21). Welsh & Morabito focused on the 18 instances of combined private and 
public action. In 5 of these 18, ASIC instigated criminal prosecutions, and in 6 of the 18 they 
instigated civil penalty proceedings.  ASIC was equally likely to pursue criminal prosecution in 
the instances where private actions succeeded and in the instances where private actions failed, 
and slightly more likely to pursue criminal penalty proceedings in the instances where private 
actions succeeded than in instances where private actions failed. Although these samples are too 
small to be conclusive they suggest that private and public regulatory decisions and outcomes are 
shaped by different factors, and that objective merit is only one of those factors. 
Lande & Davis report that 15 of the 40 private antitrust class actions that they studied (38 
percent) arose before any investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). In some of 
these cases (all of which settled for at least $50 million) public enforcement followed the 
initiation of a private class action, in others there was never any public action.136 In other 
instances there was a combination of private and public action but it was impossible to determine 
which came first. As Lande & Davis write, “the relationship between DOJ enforcement and 
private class actions is symbiotic.”137 In 13 of the 40 settled class actions, defendants were 
subject to criminal penalties and in 12 of the 40 cases defendants agreed to pay civil penalties.138 
The 40 settled class actions had a combined aggregate settlement value (including attorney fees 
and expenses) of about 22 billion in 2010 dollars. Arguing in favor of the deterrent value of 
private class actions, Lande & Davis compare this to 7.7 billion (2010 dollars) in criminal fines 
levied by the DOJ during the same period.139  
As part of their study of consumer class actions against insurance companies, Pace et al., 
surveyed state insurance regulators and asked them to rank the claims brought in those actions by 
degree of relationship to the regulators’ scope of authority. Using these rankings, the researchers 
report that the majority of the private suits overlapped with the public regulators’ scope of 
authority either substantially (22 percent) or moderately (59 percent).140 Insurance company 
defendants argued that regulators had exclusive or primary jurisdiction in about 12 percent of the 
cases, but there was no difference in case outcomes (including pretrial dispositive outcomes for 
                                                            
136 Robert Lande & Joshua Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of 
U.S. Anti-trust Laws, 2011 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 315 (2011). Lande & Davis sampled federal antitrust class actions settled 
for amounts of $50 million or more, between 1990 and2007. 
137 Robert Lande & Joshua Davis, The Extraordinary Deterrence of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply to 
Werden, Hammond & Barnett, available at http://www.moginlaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Comparative-Deterrence-from-Private-Enforcement.pdf  In previous research I 
attempted to determine whether regulatory investigation or litigation shaped outcomes of product liability suits 
and eventually gave up.  The timeline of public-recorded events did not suggest a causal order and informants 
advised me that even participants would have difficulty determining which events “caused” others.  
138 Lande & Davis, 2011, supra note 136 at 343. 
139 Id. at 338. 
 140 Id at 71.  
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the defense) for suits in which defendants used this argument and suits in which they did not.141 
Notwithstanding the large percentage of claims that public regulators viewed as within their 
scope to regulate, public regulators intervened in only 8 percent of the 622 class actions for 
which the researchers were able to collect this information. When public regulators were active 
in the private enforcement litigation along with class counsel, class-wide settlements were more 
likely to occur than in all other cases.142 
In one of the six class consumer class actions Hensler et al. studied intensively, there was 
no regulatory investigation and in three others the relevant regulatory authority investigated and 
ruled there was no violation of the law. However, in one of the latter three cases, state attorneys 
general contravened the regulatory authority’s decision, in another, the state Supreme Court did 
so and in the third the regulator called for a change in policy notwithstanding its initial ruling. In 
two of the four mass tort class actions Hensler et al. studied, regulators either stepped in or filed 
their own suits; in a third there was a reported regulatory investigation that did not produce a 
public outcome.143 As reported supra these cases all involved substantial losses for class 
members; the disputes underlying the litigation related to causation and liability, not the injury 
facts. The case study data suggest a more complex pattern of public regulator-private 
relationships than observed in Pace et al.’s larger quantitative analysis. 
 
IV. SHOULD PUBLIC POLICY MAKERS PERMIT PRIVATE CLASS ACTIONS 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENFORCING ECONOMIC REGULATIONS? 
Faced with incomplete and inconsistent data on the effectiveness of private class actions for 
enforcing public regulations it is tempting to throw the private enforcement class action over the 
side of the metaphorical public policy boat. However, such a response ignores the general lack of 
systematic data (as compared to theory) on how well public enforcement regulates employer-
worker relationships, consumer transactions, securities markets and cartel behavior. Just as 
corporate lobbyists delight in reporting anecdotal data on the failure of some class actions to 
accomplish much, worker representatives, consumer, investor and environmental advocates can 
point to spectacular failures of public enforcement: regulatory agencies captured by industry and 
crippled by legislatures’ purposeful failure to properly fund them, individual regulators in thrall 
to the potential offered by revolving doors and sometimes suborned by monetary bribes and 
other gifts. Just as the formal and informal structural weaknesses of class action regime leave 
them open to subversion by entrepreneurial plaintiff lawyers, the formal and informal structural 
weakness of legislatures and regulatory agencies leave them open to subversion by well-
capitalized corporate lobbyists. Recent examples of such failures include the British Petroleum 
deep water drilling catastrophe in the Mexican Gulf, the sub-prime loan crisis that led to the 
                                                            
141 Id. At 96. 
142 Id. At 97. 
143Hensler et al., supra, note 8 at Table 15.4 & 421-424. 
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deepest global recession since the great depression of the 1930s, and the General Motors ignition 
switch defect that lead to fatal and injurious automobile accidents. In each of these instances 
corporate self-regulation failed as public regulators looked away, either knowingly or 
unknowingly.  
Currently there are insufficient data to perform the comparative cost-benefit analysis of 
public and private enforcement that a rational public policy maker who was not beholden to any 
particular interest group would commission before deciding to discard one approach in favor of 
the other in some or all circumstances. The lack of data is startling given the huge sums of 
private money that have been devoted to lobbying against regulatory enforcement, both public 
and private and the increasing capacity of information technology to generate and analyze 
relevant data.  
In the absence of better information, it makes more sense to build redundancy into systems 
for regulating economic behavior, than to choose one mode of enforcement over another. Just as 
airplane manufacturers incorporate multiple redundant systems into airplanes in order to 
maximize safety, public policymakers should incorporate redundancy into regulatory systems by 
creating and preserving opportunities for private actors to enforce regulations alongside of public 
enforcement. 
A. Building a Knowledge Base for Enforcing Private (and Public) Regulation 
To date, debate over the role of private enforcement of economic regulations via class 
actions has rested on theory, ideology, and political interest. Evidence that would permit us to 
assess widely-made assertions is scant and what evidence exists is ambiguous. If policymakers 
are to make evidence-based assessments of the relative contributions of private and public 
enforcement we need to develop objective data on who uses private class actions, for what 
purposes, and to what ends. In the recent past assembling these data was difficult: courts lacked 
the infrastructure to collate information on lawsuits and resources to develop such an 
infrastructure. However, in an era of “big data” the arguments that courts cannot publish such 
data are wearing thin. Modern legal systems are moving rapidly to require electronic filings and 
data entrepreneurs are becoming increasingly skillful in “scraping” data from public websites 
and creating detailed databases for analysis. Today, the challenge of building a knowledge base 
on private class actions is more a matter of will than resources. 
The essential ingredients of a class action database are: 
 Annual information on the number of putative class actions filed, by type of case 
(e.g. consumer protection, securities, anti-trust (cartel), mass accident), 
representative plaintiff (e.g. individual, financial institution, retail business, NGO, 
special purpose foundation), and type of defendant (e.g. insurer, petroleum 
company, pharmaceutical, etc.) This information can be obtained directly from 
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the complaint or, more efficiently, from a form filed by the counsel with the 
complaint. 
 Information on the date and type of disposition for each complaint (e.g. 
withdrawn or voluntarily dismissed, dismissed on substantive grounds (e.g. lack 
of jurisdiction, failure to state a plausible claim), summary judgment, tried to 
verdict, settlement). 
 For each settlement approved by the court, aggregate value, total number of class 
members who claimed, total amount ultimately delivered to class members, 
expenses to administer the settlement 
 For jurisdictions that require judicial approval of attorney fees, total fees awarded 
to class counsel 
 For jurisdictions that require cost-shifting, total cost-shift to prevailing defendants 
 
B. In Praise of Redundancy 
Redundancy is the key design principle of modern complex technical systems.144 
Understanding that individual elements of complex systems may fail in unanticipated ways, 
engineers have long adopted the principle that systems that contain redundant elements – 
“elements that work simultaneously but are capable of carrying the ‘load’ by themselves if 
required”145 – are necessary to assure product safety. Early adherents of redundancy as a design 
principle focused on incorporating multiple identical elements into complex systems so that if 
and when one failed its twin (or triplet) could take over. However as redundancy moved outside 
laboratory settings, engineers learned that simple replication was not a panacea for defective 
parts. Multiple identical elements created a need for an overarching system to manage the 
elements and that managerial system might also fail. Moreover multiple identical elements, when 
operated in the same conditions, might fail together, with the result that the posited tiny 
likelihood of all of the identical elements failing at the same time underestimated failure risk. 
With more experience, redundancy design evolved. Today, optimal redundancy is understood to 
require multiple independent elements that are functionally dissimilar. Designed by different 
engineering teams, deploying different physical principles, these independent elements are more 
likely to be able to take over critical system tasks – i.e. fly the plane – when other elements fail. 
Moreover, by combining information from multiple elements the system is more likely to be able 
to take appropriate action in response to measurement challenges.146  
                                                            
144 John Downer, WHEN FAILURE IS AN OPTION: REDUNDANCY, RELIABILITY AND REGULATION IN COMPLEX 
TECHNICAL SYSTEMS, Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics, Discussion Paper 
No. 53, May 2009 available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/36537/1/Disspaper53.pdf. 
145 Id.  at 4. 
146 Much of what engineers now understand about redundancy design is derived from analysis of airplane crashes, 
space shuttle disasters and also computer programming errors. Id. 
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Modern regulatory regimes are complex technical systems. Like hardware and software, they 
have many moving parts. Like airplanes, spacecraft, and deep water drilling their safe and 
effective performance requires human action – and judgment – at critical stages. Like pilots, the 
public regulators are susceptible to distraction. Like aeronautical engineers, they are susceptible 
to “groupthink”. Like drilling engineers their incentives to assure safety may be offset by their 
need to meet tight deadlines under budget and performance pressure. Private class action 
litigation operates as an independent element of the regulatory regime in jurisdictions that have 
authorized them for enforcement as well as compensatory purposes. Like public enforcement it 
has a non-zero failure rate, and sometimes the failures are spectacular as when a class action 
settlement allows defendants to cap their liability exposure for a small amount in exchange for 
agreeing not to challenge an over-generous attorney fee request. Changes in private class action 
rules and practices could improve their ability to play a salutary enforcement role. To understand 
what reforms are merited we need more systematic information about class action uses and 
outcomes and a more honest appraisal of public as well as private regulatory failure. 
 
